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ABSTRACT 
Patent law includes one of this country’s oldest continuous statutory 
requirements: since 1790, and without variance, inventors are entitled 
to patent only “new and useful” inventions. While “newness” receives 
constant attention and debate, usefulness has been largely ignored. 
Usefulness has transformed into the toothless and misunderstood 
“utility” doctrine, which requires that patents only have a bare 
minimum potential for use. 
This Article seeks to reinvent patentable usefulness. It is the first 
comprehensive look at usefulness and it reasons that a core benefit of the 
requirement is to aid in the commercialization of inventions. The 
Article then proposes two ways that usefulness can be used to achieve this 
goal. 
First, it justifies a current but controversial doctrinal rule: that an 
invention must have practical usefulness to be patented. Second, it 
suggests a new rule, that inventions must have commercial usefulness to 
be patented. 
Finally, the Article concludes with a discussion of the potential costs 
and benefits of usefulness and discusses future areas of research that 
would support this Article’s proposal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent law includes one of this country’s oldest continuous 
statutory requirements: since 1790, and without variance, inventors 
are entitled to patent only “new and useful” inventions.1 While 
 
 1.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
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“newness” receives constant attention and debate, usefulness has 
been largely ignored. Usefulness has transformed into the toothless 
and misunderstood “utility” doctrine, which requires that patents 
only have a bare minimum potential for use. Thus, it may not be 
surprising that at least half of all patents are worthless,2 yet the 
Patent Office continues to issue virtually useless patents like the 
“Dining Table Having Integral Dishwasher”3 or the “Feminine 
Undergarment with Calendar.”4 
Despite the social costs of granting useless patents, usefulness has 
previously remained both doctrinally and normatively under-
theorized.5 Consequently, usefulness is underused as a patent policy 
lever.6 The critical role that usefulness should—but currently fails 
to—play in the patent system warrants a critical and inventive 
examination.  
This Article seeks to reinvent patentable usefulness. It is the first 
comprehensive look at usefulness, and it reasons that a core benefit 
of the requirement is to aid in the commercialization of inventions. 
The Article then proposes two ways that usefulness can be used to 
achieve this goal. 
 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–12 
(Apr. 10, 1790) (repealed 1793). 
 2.  Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1526 
(2005) (“[T]his empirical study has found that 53.71% of all patentees do allow their patents 
to expire for failure to pay one of their maintenance fees.”). Presumably there are many 
worthless patents for which maintenance fees are paid. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing 
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362 (2010) (“As an empirical matter, it appears that less, 
probably much less, than half of all patented product inventions are commercialized.”). 
 3.  U.S. Patent No. 5,687,752 (filed Nov. 15, 1995). 
 4.  U.S. Patent No. 5,606,748 (filed Jan. 29, 1996). 
 5.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Patentability 
of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA 
Q.J. 1, 4 (1995) (“One source of difficulty in defining the content of the utility requirement is 
a lack of clarity as to its underlying purposes.”); Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of 
Useful Art[icle]s?: An Analysis of the Current Utility Standards of Pharmaceutical Products and 
Biotechnological Research Tools, 38 IDEA 625, 641 (1998) (“It is noteworthy that economists, 
though interested in the study of utility and efficiency of social arrangements, have not 
sufficiently focused their attention on the utility requirement in the patent law.”); Note, The 
Utility Requirement in the Patent Law, 53 GEO. L.J. 154, 156 (1964) [hereinafter Utility 
Requirement] (“The unfortunate result . . . has been confusion as to the meaning and purpose 
of the constitutional requirement of utility in invention.”). 
 6.  DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 110–11 (2009) (noting underuse of utility as a policy lever). 
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First, it justifies a current but controversial doctrinal rule: that an 
invention must have practical usefulness to be patented. Second, it 
suggests a new rule, that inventions must have commercial usefulness 
to be patented.  
There is no dispute that a patent must be “useful,” yet no single 
word in the Patent Act has spawned so many meanings in different 
contexts; some of the confusion may simply stem from its shorthand 
designation: “utility.” While utility can mean usefulness, it can mean 
many other things as well. Economists refer to utility as a measure of 
social welfare. Designers refer to utility as functionality. 
Governments refer to utility as a public service provider. Baseball 
players and knife manufacturers refer to utility as multi-use. Farmers 
refer to utility as a type of livestock. Computer users refer to utility as 
a type of software program.  
Each of these definitions of utility might possibly apply to some 
inventions, but they are not generalized. Thus, though this Article 
adopts “utility” as a workable synonym, its focus is on usefulness.  
Part II describes three possible conceptions of usefulness that 
generally apply to inventions. First, inventions might be operable: 
current doctrine requires that inventions achieve their disclosed 
purpose. Second, inventions might be practically useful: doctrine 
requires a specific, substantial, and immediate benefit to the public. 
Third, inventions might be commercially useful: while inventions 
must promise some public benefit, the law does not currently require 
readiness for distribution or even any commercial appeal. Thus, 
applicants must currently satisfy both the operable and practical 
usefulness requirements, and this Article suggests that commercial 
usefulness should be incorporated into doctrine as well. 
Part III examines the measurement of usefulness. The type of 
usefulness measured is important. For example, the different 
conceptions are often treated as a single requirement. As a result, the 
primary literature focuses on the amount of utility rather than the 
type of utility an invention delivers. This leads to seemingly 
contradictory—but doctrinally consistent—outcomes. For example, 
marginally useful inventions like calendar underwear are patentable, 
while some potentially very useful pioneering medical treatments are 
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not because their effectiveness has not yet been established.7 
Understanding why allows for better consideration of whether 
usefulness requirements should be varied in order to achieve 
commercialization goals. 
Part IV looks at one usefulness requirement already targeted 
toward commercial goals—practical utility. Practical utility is often 
criticized as privileging mechanical inventions over chemical 
inventions, and it does to some extent. There is no dispute that 
patent policy favors applied science over basic science. However, this 
favoritism serves the important purpose of incentivizing development 
of commercially valuable chemicals. Chemicals that have no known 
purpose help the public little, and granting patents only when a 
purpose is discovered might shift limited resources toward 
discovering how new chemicals might benefit society. 
Of course, practical utility does little to resolve the apparent 
paradox that a worthless mechanical invention is still patentable 
because it has some practical use. Part V proposes commercial utility 
as a new patentability requirement designed to more directly 
incentivize activities that result in commercially useful inventions. In 
short, this Article concludes that practical usefulness is insufficient—
inventions should not be considered complete and patentable until 
there is reason to believe that they can be produced at a cost that 
consumers are willing to pay.  
This two-part doctrinal test draws on the intersection of supply 
and demand that leads to a market clearing price. In that sense, 
commercial utility comes closest to the economic definition of 
utility, here measured by consumer surplus—the difference between 
what buyers are willing to pay and the price they actually pay, usually 
the production cost of the item. Commercial utility seeks to ensure 
that inventions are worth more to the public than they cost. 
The commercial utility element proposed here offers certain 
social benefits but comes with some social costs not reflected in 
consumer surplus. At its best, it provides the benefit of channeling 
inventive activity toward commercially valuable products and 
 
 7.  See, e.g., In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (prophetic use of galantamine to treat Alzheimer’s disease was not useful where 
applicant failed to provide evidence that such treatment would be effective); Rasmusson v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (patent denied for 
beneficial cancer treatment because inventor filed before he could prove it worked). 
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services. It also has the benefit of limiting claim scope, as some broad 
but non-specific claims are less likely to be commercially viable. Yet 
the costs might include delaying the patenting of pioneering claims, 
thereby diminishing rewards for such inventions and decreasing 
incentives to pursue them. The effect of such social benefits and 
costs depends on the goals of the patent system and estimates about 
how important patenting is to different types of inventive activity. 
This part concludes by offering some possible avenues for future 
research that address benefit and cost questions arising from 
implementing commercial utility. 
II. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF UTILITY 
The usefulness requirement arguably stems from the 
Constitution, as Congress may only create laws granting exclusive 
rights “[t]o promote the progress of . . . useful arts.”8 Some have 
argued that the constitutional mandate bars patents on non-useful 
inventions,9 but this may be an overstatement. A plausible contrary 
interpretation is that “useful arts” was itself a term of art that 
distinguished the trades from science,10 such that non-useful 
inventions might be protected so long as they are part of the useful 
arts.  
Nonetheless, Congress has always considered usefulness a 
requirement; the Patent Act has protected only “useful” inventions 
since 1790.11 This single word provides little guidance, as the 
Supreme Court points out: “As is so often the case, however, a 
simple, everyday word can be pregnant with ambiguity when applied 
to the facts of life.”12  
 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 9.  Maurice W. Levy, Utility—The Inverted Criterion, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 592, 
592–93 (1948). 
 10.  Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The 
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 52 (1994) (“One may also plausibly determine the origin of the phrase 
‘useful arts.’ In 1787 ‘useful arts’ meant helpful or valuable trades. Therefore, to promote the 
progress of useful arts presupposed an intent to advance or forward the course or procession of 
such trades.”). 
 11.  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790) (repealed 1793); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2006). 
 12.  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966). 
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Courts must interpret the term despite these difficulties and have 
done so13 by linking usefulness to “utility.” Most scholars attribute 
modern utility doctrine to an 1817 opinion by Justice Story, riding 
circuit, in the first case to discuss utility in detail, Lowell v. Lewis.14 
However, a more complete theoretical kernel appears in another 
Story opinion issued a few months later in Bedford v. Hunt15: 
By useful invention, in the statute, is meant such a one as may be 
applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an 
invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good 
order of society. It is not necessary to establish, that the invention 
is of such general utility, as to supersede all other inventions now in 
practice to accomplish the same purpose. It is sufficient, that it has 
no obnoxious or mischievous tendency, that it may be applied to 
practical uses, and that so far as it is applied, it is salutary. If its 
practical utility be very limited, it will follow, that it will be of little 
or no profit to the inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into 
utter neglect. The law, however, does not look to the degree of 
utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use, and that 
the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance 
or prohibit.16 
In this short quotation, Justice Story introduces three distinct 
conceptions of usefulness: operable, practical, and commercial 
(including moral) usefulness. These are not the only possible 
conceptions, but their historical source and their continued relevance 
provide a conceptual framework for understanding and applying the 
usefulness requirement. 
Currently only operability and practicality are required; 
commerciality is not. 
 
 13.  Donald L. Zuhn, Jr., Comment, DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility 
Requirement, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 984 (2001) (“Inventors have had to rely instead 
on the interpretations of the term ‘useful’ as provided by the federal courts . . . .”). 
 14.  15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 15.  3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 16.  Id. at 37. 
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A. Operable Usefulness 
Operable usefulness requires that a patented invention must 
actually achieve some intended result. This category comes from 
Bedford’s requirement that an invention “shall be capable of use.”17 
Thus, modern operable utility requirements exclude three types 
of inoperable inventions: 
 1. Impossible inventions: Inventions that violate the laws of 
nature—most notoriously perpetual motion machines18—are 
considered inoperable. 
 2. Prophetic inventions: Inventions that could work, but that 
someone familiar with the subject matter would view as unworkable, 
are considered inoperable absent some evidence to the contrary.19 
Untested pharmaceuticals often fall under this category.  
 3. Incompletely disclosed inventions: Inventions that cannot be 
implemented by following the patent’s teachings are considered 
inoperable.20 This typically arises where the inventor has left details 
out of the patent specification or where the claimed invention could 
not work as described. Failure may occur due to inadvertent drafting 
error or due to the inventor’s misunderstanding of the purported 
invention. This category differs from the other two because the 
achievement of the invention is believable even if the inventor has 
not described a successful result.21 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See, e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989); U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(a) (8th ed. rev. 
2010) (“A rejection on the ground of lack of utility includes the more specific grounds of 
inoperativeness, involving perpetual motion.”). 
 19.  See Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 20.  Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (claim language leads to “nonsensical result”); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 21.  Unsurprisingly, this type of operability is closely related to Section 112’s 
enablement requirement that requires an applicant to disclose how to make an invention. 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Brooktree, 977 F.2d at 1571 (“In this case the questions of utility and 
enablement turned on the same disputed facts, and were treated similarly at the trial.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:28:05 PM 
1195 Reinventing Usefulness 
 1203 
B. Practical Usefulness 
The practical usefulness prong can be traced to Bedford’s 
teaching that “[i]t is sufficient . . . that [the invention] may be 
applied to practical uses . . . .”22 The modern practical utility 
requirement was announced by the Supreme Court in 1966; Brenner 
v. Manson23 ruled that inventions must have some currently available 
specific and substantial use to satisfy § 101’s “useful” requirement.24 
Brenner also ruled that processes that make “useless” products also 
lack practical utility.25 
Practical utility is also reflected in § 112, which requires 
inventors to disclose how to use an invention.26 If there is no use for 
the invention, then the inventor cannot comply with § 112’s “how 
to use” requirement.27  
There are many inventions that are useful, but only for further 
study. These inventions are treated as being practically useless. For 
example, the law denies patents on compositions of matter with no 
currently known use, but with a potential use that might be revealed 
after further experimentation. When such use is revealed, the 
composition would have patentable practical utility. 
Not all inventions have the potential for practical use, though. 
Some types of inventions will never exhibit practical utility. These 
inventions, like the pet rock, fail to “do something” no matter how 
much they are studied.28 
 
 22.  Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); see also Many v. Jagger, 16 
F. Cas. 677, 682 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (“The new idea must be reduced to some practical use 
before it can become the subject of a patent . . . .”). 
 23.  383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
 24.  Id. at 534–35 (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the 
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an 
invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this 
point—where specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient 
justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”). 
 25.  Id. at 535. 
 26.  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 27.  In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“[I]f such compositions are 
in fact useless, appellant’s specification cannot have taught how to use them.”). The role of 
usefulness in patent disclosures related to section 112 will be addressed in a future article. 
 28.  Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 634 (2008). 
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C. Commercial Usefulness 
A third concept arising from Bedford v. Hunt is the commercial 
usefulness of the invention. Bedford ruled that an invention need not 
“supersede all other inventions now in practice”29 or even be 
commercially useful30 at all.31 This is a laissez faire approach to 
commercially viable innovation.  
The beneficial or “moral” utility requirement discussed in 
Bedford is an included part of the commercial usefulness conception. 
Justice Story’s early opinions required that “the invention should not 
be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
morals of society.”32 Though nominally grounded in morality, 
history has revealed a link to commerce. In essence, patents were 
disfavored in areas where courts desired to limit commercial 
innovation. Thus, inventions that change the appearance but not the 
function of products were not useful,33 gambling machines were 
considered non-beneficial,34 and courts debated the utility of guns, 
eventually allowing them.35  
Modern cases further support this Article’s assertion that moral 
utility is part of commercial usefulness. For example, a prominent 
Federal Circuit opinion rejected a moral utility challenge by 
describing the commercial appeal of several inventions designed to 
 
 29.  Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 30.  Because it is not required to sustain a patent, “commercial usefulness” is doctrinally 
undefined. This Article later suggests that a commercially useful invention can be 
manufactured at a cost that a sufficient number of buyers will pay to form a market. 
 31.  See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (“But if the 
invention steers wide of these objections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance 
very material to the interests of the patentee, but of no importance to the public. If it be not 
extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt and disregard.”); Bell v. Daniels, 3 F. Cas. 
96, 98 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1858) (finding that invention must be completely worthless to be 
invalidated in utility grounds); Shaw v. Colwell Lead Co., 11 F. 711, 715 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1882); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 453 
(2004) (“Simply put, patent law has no aversion to awarding commercially worthless property 
rights.”). 
 32.  Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019. 
 33.  See Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1925) 
(finding that false seam on seamless stocking is unpatentable); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 
(2d Cir. 1900) (finding that invention that made tobacco leaves appear spotted is 
unpatentable). 
 34.  Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897). 
 35.  Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275–76 (7th Cir. 1903). 
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deceive others.36 Further, because gambling is legal in several states 
(and thus commercially acceptable), gambling devices are now 
considered beneficially useful.37 
In short, because commercial utility is not required, moral utility 
is essentially ignored today;38 courts instead apply the laissez faire 
attitude generally applicable to commerciality and have stopped 
making judgments about what is “good” for society. Instead, they 
allow the market to decide which inventions are morally acceptable 
and leave false advertising laws to remedy over-promised usefulness.39 
Nonetheless, some people still advocate using commercial usefulness 
standards to limit patentability. They argue that controversial 
technologies should be unpatentable to disincentivize their 
commercial development.40 Indeed, some technologies are statutorily 
barred from patentability, such as nuclear weapons.41 
Proposed limits based on commercial use have not taken hold; 
while practical and operable utility might require the potential for 
commercial usefulness in some cases, the other conceptions are not 
effective substitutes because they do not require any real likelihood 
that consumers will pay for the invention. Because no patentability 
requirement effectively regulates the commercial appeal of 
inventions, it is no wonder that commercially useless patents 
routinely issue. 
Three critical assumptions underlie normative justifications for 
the current lack of a commercial usefulness requirement. First, 
justifications for ignoring commerciality assume that commercial 
appeal depends on the eye of the beholder; there may be commercial 
value in inventions that are inferior to existing products, such as 
 
 36.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 37.  Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 803 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1977) (citing Fuller, 
120 F. at 275) (explaining that moral utility requires invention to be devoid of any beneficial 
use at all). 
 38.  See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 111. 
 39.  Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1368 (“The requirement of ‘utility’ in patent law is not a 
directive to the Patent and Trademark Office or the courts to serve as arbiters of deceptive 
trade practices. Other agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug 
Administration, are assigned the task of protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the 
sale of food products.”). 
 40.  Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions About 
Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69, 89–90 (2001).  
 41.  42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2000). 
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cheaper manufacturing or the ability to charge less for inferior 
quality. This assumption seems reasonable. Second, they assume that 
commerciality is best measured after the fact because it is difficult to 
measure commercial usefulness ex ante; instead, the market best 
decides whether an invention is commercially useful.42 Third, they 
assume that issuing commercially useless patents is costless; 
theoretically, only the patentee is harmed if the patent has no 
commercial value. The latter two assumptions may not survive 
scrutiny as discussed further in Part IV. 
III. MEASURING USEFULNESS 
Usefulness cannot be used as a commercialization tool without 
understanding how and when it should be measured. For example, 
many misunderstand how the different conceptions of usefulness 
relate to the amount of utility required for patentability. Further, the 
timing of the inquiry is of critical, but understudied, importance. 
Quantity, category, and timing shape the remainder of this Article’s 
proposals. A new commercial usefulness requirement will be 
ineffective if it is unclear how and when such usefulness will be 
measured. 
A. Quantity v. Category 
It is important to distinguish between the amount of utility 
required and the type of utility required. Failure to distinguish the 
two makes it difficult to rigorously assess the effect of each of the 
utility conceptions on commercialization (or any other goal of the 
patent system). 
This Article concludes that quantity should not be measured, but 
that each type of utility must be present before the invention is 
complete. Thus, a patent must satisfy each required type of 
usefulness, but only through a de minimis showing. This rule allows 
for each conception of utility to achieve its purpose without 
imposing high measurement costs on patent examiners and courts. 
 
 42.  Koneru, supra note 5, at 649 (“Because the patent grant is a means, not a 
guarantee, to achieve commercial gains, the basic quid pro quo is best determined by the 
market place, not by the patent office. An inventor creates his own reward, which is directly 
dependent on the invention's contribution to the society.”). 
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1. Quantity 
Each conception of usefulness should be judged on a de minimis 
basis; any quantity of utility should suffice. This is, for the most part, 
the current state of the law, and the best rule in any event. It may 
seem odd that usefulness should be judged using a pass/fail 
standard, and that no court has attempted to define a threshold 
degree of utility. Because the allure of measuring the degree of utility 
is apparent, it would be satisfying to only allow patents for really 
useful inventions and to deny protection of mostly useless 
inventions. Indeed, earlier versions of the Patent Act required 
inventions to be “sufficiently useful and important,”43 implying that 
Congress may have intended such a measurement of utility. 
In practice, however, limiting patents to those that meet a pre-
determined degree of utility would likely be too costly and 
unworkable.44 Examiners lack the expertise and time to measure the 
degree of practical use of a chemical or machine, especially during 
patent examination before the product has been brought to market. 
Further, courts are ill-suited to determine that an invention works 
“well enough.” More generally, requiring usefulness on an analog or 
probabilistic scale would require expertise and unquestioned 
discretion by the PTO, normative judgments by judges and juries, 
and far too much pre-filing research by patentees.45 Furthermore, 
many inventions have only marginal usefulness when created, but 
become incredibly useful in the future.46 Finally, different consumers 
may want different degrees of usefulness at different costs.47 
 
 43. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 120 (1836) (repealed 1870). See Part 
IV for further discussion of this provision. 
 44. Cherylyn A.P. Esoy, Comment, The PTO’s 2001 Revised Utility Examination 
Guidelines For Gene Patent Applications: Has the PTO Exceeded the Scope of Authority 
Delineated by the Court’s Interpretation of a “Useful” Invention?, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 
157 (2002) (discussing costs associated with determining a degree of utility). 
 45. Ex parte Cheesebrough, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 18, 19 (1869) (“[The Patent 
Office] can only see that the purpose proposed, if accomplished, would be useful . . . . Beyond 
this it can only oppose the opinion of man to man—an opinion by which, if all our great 
inventions had been tried when first presented to the office or the public, the great majority of 
them would have been strangled at birth by the unfriendly hand of adverse criticism.”). 
 46. Polypropylene, one of the most important inventions of the twentieth century, was 
not useful at the time of the 1954 patent filing. E.g., In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1203 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (holding that the patent applicant “did not assert any practical use for the 
polypropylene” and “did not disclose any characteristics of the polypropylene . . . that 
demonstrated its utility”); see also Brent Nelson Rushforth, The Patentability of Chemical 
Intermediates, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 497, 510–12 (1968) (“Other inventions may possess only 
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Instead, the test should be whether one skilled in the art believes 
that some de minimis utility is present with respect to each of the 
applicable conceptions. Such a yes/no test leaves utility in good 
company because all of the other requirements of patentability are 
similar. A claimed invention is either known in the prior art, or it is 
not;48 a specification either enables one to make an invention, or it 
does not;49 and a claim is either definite, or it is not.50 Even non-
obviousness, though highly context specific, yields a single answer: 
one does not ask how obvious the invention was, only that it was 
obvious.51 
2. Category 
The conceptions of usefulness usually encompass each other. If 
something is commercially useful, then it usually follows that it is 
also practically useful and operable. Even if commercial utility is not 
considered, practical usefulness usually entails operability. 
In the general case where the conceptions overlap, a single de 
minimis level utility will suffice. If, however, one of the conceptions 
is satisfied while the others are not, then usefulness must be 
considered for each category. Thus, an invention may operate as 
designed, even if there is no practical use for it (such as the process 
for making an unknown-use chemical). This is not the only 
combination; an invention might be practically useful and still be 
inoperable for the intended purpose. For example, a claimed 
perpetual motion machine might be practically useful as an energy 
generator, but inoperable because it could not achieve 100% 
efficiency. Indeed, some inventions might be highly commercially 
useful despite lacking operable or practical utility. For example, the 
 
minimal utility at the time of the granting of the patent and later become extremely valuable to 
the public and to the patentee through the later development of new and unpredictable 
uses.”). 
 47. Rushforth, supra note 46, at 512. 
 48. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (2006); but see Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction 
Problem in Patent Law, 105 Nw. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that enablement is a 
non-precise standard), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/ 
working_papers/0933LevelsofAbstraction20090714.pdf. 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2. 
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
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pet rock has no use without its packaging and marketing.52 An 
extreme example might be the “Bag O’ Glass” made famous by Dan 
Akroyd on Saturday Night Live.53 
3. Confusing quantity and category 
Perhaps the most confused discussion in utility doctrine is the 
“amount” of usefulness that should be required for patentability. 
Debate on this question has befuddled scholars54 and courts alike. 
The splintered In re Kirk55 opinion exemplifies this confusion. The 
application at issue claimed several steroid compounds with no 
known therapeutic use.56 The majority rejected the claims because 
the only evidence of use set forth by the applicant was a statement 
that the steroids showed “biological activity.”57 Judge Rich disagreed 
and detailed his interpretation of utility doctrine58 to argue that only 
de minimis utility is required for patentability and that “biological 
 
 52. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 428 (1891) (“That the extent to which a 
patented device has gone into use is an unsafe criterion, even of its actual utility, is evident 
from the fact that the general introduction of manufactured articles is as often effected by 
extensive and judicious advertising, activity in putting the goods upon the market, and large 
commissions to dealers, as by the intrinsic merit of the articles themselves.”). The author could 
not locate any patent claiming the pet rock. See, e.g., Method for Forming a Decorative 
Novelty Device, U.S. Patent No. 4,082,871 (filed Jan. 5, 1977) (claiming a process for making 
a novelty rock, but not claiming the rock itself); Virtual Pet Home Page, Pet Rock Page, 
http://www.virtualpet.com/vp/farm/petrock/petrock.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (no 
patent on the pet rock). 
 53. Consumer Probe, Saturday Night Live Transcripts, Season 2, Episode 10, 
http://snltranscripts.jt.org/76/76jconsumerprobe.phtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (“We’re 
just packaging what the kids want! I mean, it’s a creative toy, you know? If you hold this up, 
you know, you see colors, every color of the rainbow! I mean, it teaches him about light 
refraction, you know?”). 
 54. See J. Timothy Meigs, Biotechnology Patent Prosecution in View of PTO’s Utility 
Examination Guidelines, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 451, 464–65 (2001) (mixing 
discussion of “nebulous” practical utility with minimal “threshold” of utility); see also id. at 
470–71 (mixing operable and practical utility); Michelle L. Johnson, Comment, In re Brana 
and the Utility Examination Guidelines: A Light at the End of the Tunnel?, 49 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 285, 290 (1996) (“This threshold view of the required utility was later explicitly rejected 
[in Brenner].”). 
 55. 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 56. Id. at 937–38. 
 57. Id. at 941 (“It seems to us that the nebulous expressions ‘biological activity’ or 
‘biological properties’ appearing in the specification convey no more explicit indication of the 
usefulness of the compounds and how to use them than [a prior rejected patent].”). 
 58. Id. at 950–53 (Rich, J., dissenting). 
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activity” was a sufficient showing, as was potential use for further 
research.59 
However, each side addressed a different issue, which causes 
apparent confusion. The majority ruled that there was no utility in a 
particular category, namely practical utility.60 The dissent essentially 
argued that any utility in any category is sufficient, even if there is no 
practical benefit to the public.61 The confusion is compounded by 
the court’s doctrinal disagreement about whether “future study” is 
sufficient to satisfy practical utility.62 Furthermore, neither opinion 
discusses, nor is it easy to discern, how a steroid with no known use 
can be operable. 
Confusion caused by failing to differentiate the conceptions of 
usefulness is not limited to case law. For example, one commentator 
argues that games need show only minimal utility (entertainment), 
while therapeutic compounds are subjected to heightened 
requirements (efficacy).63 The commentator confused categories in 
making the argument; the question is about two different types of 
usefulness. Whether games can be used for entertainment is a 
question of practical utility, which is easy to discern. However, 
whether therapeutic drugs are effective is a question of operable 
utility, which may be difficult to discern and thus requires additional 
evidence.  
The inevitable result is that the utility standard appears to favor 
some technologies over others.64 Where it is difficult to measure 
utility, such as the operability of therapeutics, then it will appear that 
the operable utility test is biased against therapeutics. Where 
usefulness is associated with further research, such as the discovery of 
 
 59. Id. at 949 (Rich, J., dissenting). As the discussion in the next section shows, the 
history of utility requirements is not as clear as Judge Rich implies. 
 60. Id. at 944–45 (majority opinion) (“There can be no doubt that the insubstantial, 
superficial nature of vague, general disclosures or arguments of ‘useful in research’ or ‘useful as 
building blocks of value to the researcher’ was recognized, and clearly rejected, by the 
[Brenner v. Manson decision].”). 
 61. Id. at 949 (Rich, J., dissenting) (“I believe, as hereinafter stated, that usefulness, to 
chemists doing research on steroids, as intermediates to make other compounds they desire to 
make is sufficient.”). 
 62. Id. (characterizing Brenner’s practical utility requirement as dicta). 
 63. Nathan Machin, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement 
of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 426, 433–34 (1999). 
 64. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 112 (arguing that standard for utility is 
“substantially higher” in chemical and life sciences). 
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new chemical compounds, then it will appear that the practical utility 
test is biased against basic science.  
However, these apparent biases are no different than in other 
patentability criteria. For example, prior art may be difficult to find 
for computer software inventions. Such difficulties do not mean that 
novelty is biased in favor of software, but only that evidence is more 
costly to obtain to reject software claims. Similarly, utility is not 
biased; it is just that equal application may be harder to prove in 
some fields.65 
Understanding the category/quantity distinction clarifies much 
of the doctrinal and scholarly confusion. Under this rubric, the 
debate in Kirk is resolved; because Kirk could not describe how the 
claimed steroid might be used, the claim lacked practical utility. 
Further, the inventor could not show operability because the 
“biological activity” was too vague to show potential therapeutic 
effects. Based on a complete lack of utility in both categories, the 
invention was unpatentable. While the dissent was correct that a de 
minimis amount of utility was required, it was incorrect in assuming 
that this amount had been satisfied. Neither generalized biological 
activity nor further research was the type of utility that could satisfy 
the minimal threshold. 
B. Timing is Important 
While inventors can file a patent application without building the 
invention, they cannot do so without determining its use.66 Where 
no use has been discovered, the law considers the invention 
 
 65. See Alfred W. Vibber, Utility—A Requisite in Reduction to Practice, 30 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 773, 781–82 (1948) (“It may be that it would be desirable in reduction to practice in 
the chemical field to relax somewhat under certain circumstances the rigorous requirements for 
the proof of utility, but there is no doubt that as the law now stands an inventor must meet the 
same tests as regards utility in the chemical field that he does in the mechanical field.”). 
 66. Bogoslowsky v. Huse, 142 F.2d 75, 76–77 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (no actual reduction to 
practice until operable utility is tested). But see S. Wolffe, Adequacy of Disclosure as Regards 
Specific Embodiment and Use of Invention, 41 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 65 
(1959) (explaining that practical use requirement might unfairly require chemical inventors to 
actually reduce inventions to practice); Stanley H. Cohen & Charles H. Schwartz, Editorial 
Note, Do Chemical Intermediates Have Patentable Utility?, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 87, 106 
(1960) (explaining that chemical must be produced and utility shown to be reduced to 
practice). 
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incomplete and unpatentable, even if a patent application has been 
filed.67 
For example, several companies sought patents on gene 
fragments before they knew what function the genes performed. 
Scholars and courts have debated whether such fragments have 
patentable utility,68 and the Federal Circuit recently held that such 
fragments lacked practical utility.69 The ruling will delay the filing of 
such claims. If, on the other hand, practical utility requirements were 
eased to allow patenting of DNA fragments, then claims would be 
filed earlier.70 This example demonstrates that timing is critically 
important to utility’s role as a policy lever.71 
Furthermore, every claim must be useful to be a complete 
invention. While a few embodiments described in a patent 
application might be useful, the broader concepts envisioned by the 
patent might lack one of the categories of utility. For example, a 
claim may be so broad that it covers primarily inoperable 
embodiments. Thus, in The Incandescent Lamp Patent,72 the 
Supreme Court invalidated a patent claiming all fibrous filaments in 
light bulbs where some filaments worked, but most filaments were 
inoperable. 
Thus, varying the type or amount of usefulness required can vary 
the timing and breadth of patent filings,73 and, in turn, can 
 
 67. See, e.g., In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Polypropylene, one 
of the most important inventions of the 20th century, was not useful at the time of the 1954 
patent filing). 
 68. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the concern that 
“allowing . . . patents without proof of utility would discourage research, delay scientific 
discovery, and thwart progress in the ‘useful Arts’ and ‘Science’”). 
 69. Id. at 1379. 
 70. Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents—A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 768, 781 (1969) (“There are several incentives to early patent 
application including the first inventor’s absolute control of the compound . . . ; the necessity 
of, and the potential difficulties in, securing rights to a patented compound should a new use 
be found; and the potential profit realizable from sales to others for uses never contemplated . . 
. . [I]n their own self-interest and for their own protection, inventors must apply as soon as 
possible, often before any real commercial use is found.”). 
 71. Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 5, at 6 (“One plausible reading of this opinion is 
that the utility requirement serves a timing function . . . .”). 
 72. 159 U.S. 465, 472–73 (1895). 
 73. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 65, 75–76 (2009) (arguing that requiring an inventor to find a “commercially beneficial 
use” for an invention, supported by appropriate data, would address the early filing problem 
caused by the current lax utility requirement). 
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profoundly affect races to the patent office.74 This applies even if the 
patent system were reformed to grant patents to the first to file an 
application, because the first filer is not entitled to priority if no use 
is established at the time of filing. 
Patent timing can have significant effects on commercialization, 
and this Article’s proposals would be incomplete without the 
consideration of timing. 
1. Distinguishing non-useful inventions from potentially useful 
inventions 
Some inventions will never be useful, while others are simply not 
useful at the time of invention. Distinguishing between these two 
types at first appears irrelevant to whether a patent should be granted 
because utility is required at the time an invention is completed. 
Patent examiners need not consider future utility; patents only issue 
if there is utility apparent in the application.75 As a result, no one 
ever asks whether an invention might have future utility because the 
answer resolves no dispute. 
It is no surprise, then, that much of utility doctrine stems from 
interferences, which are disputes between two applicants claiming 
the same invention. The winner is usually the first inventor to 
complete the invention, known as reducing the invention to practice. 
In turn, reduction to practice must include knowledge of a claim’s 
utility. Interferences often involve one inventor claiming that the 
other did not complete the invention by a particular date because the 
invention’s use was unknown as of that date. Indeed, the leading 
Supreme Court case on utility, Brenner, was an interference appeal.76 
Because interferences test the date on which use was first known, 
questions of perpetually useless inventions never arise. 
 
 74. See Koneru, supra note 5, at 626–27 (explaining that early disclosure of an invention 
is a “fundamental objective of the patent system” and that granting a patent only when a use is 
shown “discourages early disclosure of inventions that are otherwise technically meritorious,” 
which may result in abandoned applications). 
 75. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“Until the process claim has been 
reduced to production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that 
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation.”); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1044 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Where a constructive reduction to practice is involved, as contrasted to an 
actual reduction to practice, a practical utility for the invention is determined by reference to, 
and a factual analysis of, the disclosures of the application.”). 
 76. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 521. 
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However, distinguishing inventions that may have future use 
from those that will not is relevant outside of priority battles. The 
ambivalence toward post-application utility ignores utility’s two 
distinct functions: determining completion of the invention and 
determining general patentability. Failure to separately consider 
these two functions, and the timing associated with them, 
undermines utility’s role as a policy lever for different classes of 
inventions.  
For example, failure to distinguish never-useful inventions from 
undiscovered-use inventions blurs commercial analysis of utility. 
Since Justice Story’s statement in Lowell that “[a]ll that the law 
requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious,”77 
conventional wisdom has accepted that utility should be de minimis 
because mostly useless inventions will not affect others who wish to 
create useful inventions.78 However, not all minimal use inventions 
will remain so; some require product development while others 
require complements such as cheaper manufacturing, component 
parts, or distribution.79 On the other hand, some inventions will 
never be of significant use to the public.  
Timing considerations are not limited to practical utility; 
operable utility might also be time sensitive. Take, for example, fast-
tracked pharmaceuticals like a flu vaccine. Investment in creating 
such pharmaceuticals would be incentivized by patents, and 
especially by early patents.80 Because operable utility must also exist 
at the time of filing, the invention is not complete if a person familiar 
with the technology would not believe the vaccine to have effective 
potential.81 However, where two researchers claim to invent the same 
 
 77. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
 78. See, e.g., Many v. Jagger, 16 F. Cas. 677, 681 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 9055) 
(holding that infringement of a patent implies that the patent must be useful: “[I]f [an 
invention] is at all valuable, if its use for the purpose for which it is constructed is practicable, 
that is sufficient to sustain it as a useful invention.”). 
 79. Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1065, 1081 n.63 (2007) (“[I]t might not make sense to commercialize a particular 
invention until another, complementary invention is developed.”); see Richard R. Nelson, The 
Economics of Invention: A Survey of the Literature, 32 J. BUS. 101, 104 (1959) (“Many 
inventions occurred when they did because of shortly preceding scientific breakthroughs that 
had lowered the ‘cost’ of invention.”). 
 80. See Nelson, supra note 79, at 107. 
 81. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534–35; Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 
1318, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (refusing to find utility when “a person of ordinary skill in 
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vaccine, operability should be irrelevant; either they both have 
therapeutic benefits or neither has.82 Yet, under current law a 
contested patent would go to the first to perform a few tests rather 
than the first to create the drug. 
This leads to a utility policy pivot. Granting the patent to the 
first to carry out successful tests might create an incentive to test too 
soon. Granting the patent to the first to create the drug might limit 
wasted resources associated with patent races. Further, because 
operable utility of pharmaceuticals is often evidentiary,83 utility can 
act as a timing lever if tests showing therapeutic effectiveness are 
allowed after the patent application is filed.84  
This type of pivot is easily achievable by the courts. The Patent 
Act requires only instructions about how to make and use the 
invention;85 the requirement that operable or practical utility be 
apparent in an application is judicially mandated and modifiable. 
Further, because the utility standard is different than the FDA drug 
approval standard,86 there is no therapeutic harm to encouraging 
early filings; the only effect is an investment incentive.87 Of course, 
allowing early filing may not provide the desired incentives, but the 
point is that the timing of different types of utility is important and 
can be adjusted to suit policy needs. 
 
the area would not have believed” that the invention was useful as claimed and when evidence 
of effectiveness was acquired after filing). 
 82. The practical utility of a targeted pharmaceutical like a vaccine is apparent and 
would also be irrelevant in a priority contest. 
 83. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 531–32 (“Even on the assumption that the process would be 
patentable were respondent to show that the steroid produced had a tumor-inhibiting effect in 
mice, we would not overrule the Patent Office finding that respondent has not made such a 
showing.”). 
 84. Cf. Koneru, supra note 5, at 658 (“Thus, the irony is that, in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, what is useful according to Brana may lack any practical utility in the real 
world if the FDA declares that the patented compound is not safe and effective for human 
treatment.”). 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of 
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it . . . .”). 
 86. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 87. In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 255 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“True it is that such substance 
would be more useful if they were not dangerous or did not have undesirable side effects, but 
the fact remains that they are useful, useful to doctors, veterinarians and research workers, 
useful to patients, both human and lower animal, and so are useful within the meaning of 35 
U.S.C. § 101.”). 
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In short, there is a big difference between an invention with no 
use and one with no use yet.88 Ironically, Justice Story’s view implies 
that interminably useless patents should not be a concern even 
though current doctrine disdains such inventions the most. 
However, patenting inventions that have no current use, but might 
have future use, may impose the greatest cost on society.89 
Ignoring post-invention developments thus affects Justice Story’s 
laissez faire attitude toward utility. This is not a normative 
pronouncement about what the law should be; some might argue 
that broad patents should issue early to incentivize the inventor,90 
while others might argue that narrow patents should issue late to 
unblock future inventors.91 Regardless of normative viewpoint, the 
timing for determining whether and how an invention is useful must 
be considered to fully understand the doctrine’s power. 
IV. RE-EXAMINING PRACTICAL UTILITY 
Practical utility requires some known use other than as an object 
of, or tool for, research;92 and whether chemicals and other 
compositions with unknown uses should be considered useful has 
vexed scholars for years.93 Indeed, much utility scholarship focuses 
on this quandary. 
Three questions dominate the discussion: 1) whether practical 
utility is a “legitimate” test; 2) whether use as a research tool 
 
 88. Some cases state that use by others implies utility, but these cases do not look at 
usefulness at the time of invention. See, e.g., Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 143 U.S. 587, 595 
(1892); Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U.S. 94, 96–97 (1881). It may be that a patent had no 
use at the time of invention, but acquired a use later based on complementary technology. 
 89. Zuhn, supra note 13, at 986 (“However, because the function of these sequences 
can be eventually determined, such sequences are not truly useless, and therefore, limited 
monopolies extended on such sequences may ultimately be of great cost to the public.” 
(citation omitted)). Part IV below discusses some of the costs associated with allowing patents 
on inventions with yet undiscovered practical utility. 
 90. A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First 
Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1127 (1989). 
 91. See, e.g., Eggert, supra note 70, at 781–82 (“The first inventor is rewarded for much 
more than he has given. He discloses one use, yet is ‘paid’ for all. Furthermore, the necessity of 
seeking the first inventor’s cooperation can hardly be an inducement to experimentation or 
investment by others.”). 
 92. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 93. Other types of practically useless inventions—such as the pet rock—surely exist, but 
these have escaped the attention of most scholars. 
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(including as a chemical intermediary)94 is patentable utility; and 3) 
whether compositions with currently undiscovered uses should be 
patentable. This part re-examines these three questions and 
introduces a new way to think about practical utility: as a way to 
increase commercialization of patented inventions. 
A. Statutory and Precedential Legitimacy of Practical Utility 
Brenner’s practical utility rule was initially controversial. The 
patent office had often allowed patents claiming chemicals without 
any known use other than scientific research. Many thus argued that 
Brenner changed the law.95 
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s 
reading of the practical utility standard is congressionally sanctioned. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (predecessor to the 
Federal Circuit) issued a ruling quite similar to Brenner v. Manson in 
its 1950 decision In re Bremner96 (note the confusing similarity 
between Brenner and Bremner).  
A mere two years after Bremner, Congress enacted a completely 
overhauled Patent Act, written in part by Judge Rich. The revised act 
did not overrule or otherwise seek to cabin Bremner’s practical utility 
rule. 
Judge Rich argued that Congress did not intend a practical 
utility standard because the case law prior to 1952 did not have such 
a requirement.97 He did not understand Bremner to require practical 
utility.98 As part of his push for a single de minimis utility standard, 
Judge Rich’s dissent in In re Kirk99 argues that Bremner merely 
 
 94. A chemical intermediary is a chemical which has no purpose other than use in a 
process to make another chemical. If the end product has no practical use, then the chemical 
intermediary has no practical use under the current law. 
 95. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 952–54 (Rich, J., dissenting); Eisenberg & Merges, 
supra note 5, at 5 (“The U.S. Supreme Court suggested a larger role for the utility 
requirement in Brenner v. Manson.” (citation omitted)). 
 96. 182 F.2d 216, 217 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (“It is our view that no ‘hard and fast’ ruling 
properly may be made fixing the extent of the disclosure of utility necessary in an application, 
but we feel certain that the law requires that there be in the application an assertion of utility and 
an indication of the use or uses intended.”).  
 97. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 952–54 (Rich, J., dissenting). 
 98. Judge Rich was not on the panel that decided Bremner. 
 99. 376 F.2d 936, 947–966 (Rich, J. dissenting). 
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required a statement of use, and that the Patent Office incorrectly 
reinterpreted that statement to require practical utility.100 
This narrow interpretation of Bremner and other case law is 
suspect. While Bremner did not explicitly require practical utility, it 
implicitly did so because the invention disclosed could certainly have 
been used for further study, yet the Bremner court found a lack of 
utility.101 Further, the Kirk dissent makes no mention of Bremner’s 
pre-1952 Patent Act status. 
Even disregarding Bremner, it is not even clear that no practical 
utility requirement existed in 1952. As discussed above, practical use 
was mentioned by Justice Story as early as 1817.102 Potter v. Tone,103 
a key case that Judge Rich104 and others argue required no practical 
utility, in fact involved a patent that showed some practical utility 
along with research use.105 Furthermore, many early cases appeared 
to require practical utility.106 Thus, scholars began discussing 
practical utility at the Patent Office and in courts no later than 1945, 
 
 100. Id. at 952. 
 101. Bremner, 182 F.2d at 217. 
 102. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). 
 103. 36 App. D.C. 181 (D.C. Cir. 1911). 
 104. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 953 (Rich, J., dissenting). 
 105. Potter, 36 App. D.C. at 185 (“The issues in this interference do not cover the use of 
the material in question for any specific purpose, but the production of a novel material of 
described characteristics, which characteristics may suggest many uses to subsequent inventors. 
Its value for educational purposes in demonstrating to chemists the character and properties of 
‘the long-sought silicon monoxid;’ its use as a reducing agent in chemical reactions, and the 
fact that it is a nonconductor of electricity, are sufficient to assist in promoting the progress of 
the useful arts and to establish the utility of the invention.”); Vibber, supra note 65, at 784 
(Potter v. Tone required practical utility). 
 106. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Drewson, 29 App. D.C. 161, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1907) 
(“Reduction to practice must produce something of practical use, coupled with a      
knowledge . . . that the thing will work practically for the intended purpose.”); Thomas v. 
Michael, 166 F.2d 944 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (reversing a finding of no utility where compound 
was useful as a catalyst for cracking); In re Holmes, 63 F.2d 642, 643 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (“The 
difficulty with appellant's position is that he assumes that, inasmuch as the pipe constructed in 
accordance with the claims is useful, it follows that utility of the invention is established. The 
fact is that the pipe so constructed may be useful, but there may be no utility in the particular 
form of the structure which appellant claims is invention.”); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Satler, 21 F.2d 
630, 634 (D. Conn. 1927) (“[P]laintiff has introduced theoretical evidence based upon 
practical use, which convinces me that the Lowenstein condenser produces the result ascribed 
to it in the patent.”); Safeguard Account Co. v. Wellington, 86 F. 146, 148 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1898) (failure to show a substantial step in practical utility implies a lack of invention). 
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well before Bremner was decided107 and the 1952 Patent Act was 
drafted. 
Further, Judge Rich argued that the statutory requirements 
remained unchanged since 1790, but he did not mention the re-
introduction of the “sufficiently useful and important” requirement 
in the 1836 Patent Act.108 This requirement—further discussed 
below—implies that Congress intended a heightened utility standard 
in the statute at the time Bremner was decided. 
Based on the entire history of cases and statutes, arguments that 
practical utility was newly imagined in Brenner v. Manson are not 
terribly persuasive. If Judge Rich intended to clarify Bremner and 
other cases that many people thought required some form of 
practical utility, his best opportunity to do so was when he helped 
draft the 1952 Patent Act, and he did not.109 Congress has never 
amended the rule, nor do current patent reform proposals include 
such an amendment. 
B. Research Tools 
Many inventors have tried and failed to patent chemical 
intermediaries and other inventions whose sole purposes was to aid 
further research. The question is why such applications should be 
rejected, especially when some “non-useful” inventions are in high 
demand,110 sometimes commanding high market prices.111 
 
 107. See John Boyle, Jr. & Henry C. Parker, Patents for New Chemical Compounds, 27 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 831, 835 (1945); Levy, supra note 9, at 593–94; Vibber, supra note 65, at 
778 (“It is not sufficient under such circumstances, that a device, method, or composition of 
matter be described which is proved later to have utility where no useful purpose is ascribed to 
such subject matter in the application.”). 
 108. Kirk, 376 F.2d at 954 (Rich, J., dissenting). Part V, below, discusses the 1836 
Patent Act in detail. 
 109. But see Eggert, supra note 70, at 772 (summarizing Judge Rich’s arguments in 
Kirk, 376 F.3d 936 (Rich, J., dissenting) and In re Joly, 376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, 
J., dissenting), that Congress intended that practical utility not be considered, but Brenner 
ignored Congressional intent). 
 110. See Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 5, at 6 (“[R]esearch discoveries that are the 
subject of serious scientific investigation may be sold commercially to researchers long before 
they have ripened into products for sale to the general public.”); Johnson, supra note 54, at 
312–13 (discussing the value of any information in the field, including failed inventions). 
 111. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed Cir. 2005) (discussing commercial success 
of unpatentable gene fragments). 
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High prices for research tools are not, in isolation, evidence of 
the practical use envisioned by Brenner.112 There may be several 
reasons that researchers might be willing to pay for such materials 
that are unrelated to public benefit. First, they might be costly to 
create. Second, the compound may be more pure or otherwise better 
suited for research, which is valuable but not practical under 
Brenner. Third, their manufacturing process may be secret; in fact, if 
patentability is denied, then secrecy may be the only way to obtain 
recovery of investment.  
These reasons fail to answer the primary question, which is why 
one would pay anything for something with no practical use no 
matter how rare, helpful, or secret it may be. Of course, they would 
not. There must be some use to research tools.113 This answer reveals 
a fundamental normative foundation of the patent system: basic 
science, no matter how important and valuable, does not merit 
protection and is therefore not useful in the patent sense.114 As a 
result, new compositions which do nothing but aid basic science are 
also not patentable; practical utility acts as a type of subject matter 
restriction. 
The bias against basic science is evident in case law,115 which 
routinely recites that principles of nature116 such as gravity and 
relativity are not patentable.117 It is revealed in cases that distinguish 
 
 112. See Utility Requirement, supra note 5, at 161 (arguing that commercial success is no 
longer conclusive evidence of utility because many other factors may affect commercial 
success). 
 113. David G. Perryman & Nagendra Setty, The Basis and Limits of the Patent and 
Trademark Office’s Credible Utility Standard, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 532–33 (1995). 
 114. Abramowicz, supra note 79, at 1100 (“Unsurprisingly, courts have been skeptical of 
efforts to obtain broad patent protection for scientific studies.”); Rushforth, supra note 46, at 
513 (“The decisions in Manson, Kirk and Joly seem effectively to exclude research chemists 
from the class of people for whom an invention may be useful.”). But see Cohen & Schwartz, 
supra note 66, at 90 (arguing that basic science in mechanical and electrical arts lead to clear 
practical utility); Utility Requirement, supra note 5, at 157 (explaining that intermediaries used 
in mechanical arts are generally considered useful). 
 115. See, e.g., In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“[I]s it not also 
evident that a patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm 
of philosophy?”), quoted with approval in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
 116. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 116 (1854) (“[T]he discovery of a principle in 
natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable.”). 
 117. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Likewise, Einstein could not 
patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.”). 
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between abstract and applied discoveries118 or that deny patentability 
to new discoveries about unaltered natural products.119  
Justifying the bias, on the other hand, is more difficult; the goal 
of this discussion is merely to explain it. Reasons advanced by others 
vary. Some argue that fundamental truths must be free for all;120 
some worry about the effect on downstream innovation;121 some 
distinguish between scientific knowledge and invention;122 some 
argue that scientific explanations cannot be reduced to a concrete 
right to exclude;123 and some may simply desire to incentivize 
manufacturing instead of science.124 
Even though patent policy disfavors basic science, there is still 
demand for it.125 Academic and government laboratories are in the 
business of discovery and need research tools to accomplish their 
goals. Where there is demand, someone will be willing to pay for the 
required prerequisites, and thus there is a market for unpatentable 
research tools.126 No matter how strong this market is, the tools and 
their end result will not be considered practically useful until applied 
 
 118. See, e.g.,  MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) 
(reasoning that “a novel and useful structure,” such as a radio antenna, could be patentable 
subject matter even though its dimensions directly correspond to a natural phenomenon). 
 119. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948). 
 120. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“A principle, in the 
abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no 
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.” (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 
175 (1853))). 
 121. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 
VA. L. REV. 305, 320–31 (1992). 
 122. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 79, at 105. But cf. Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 5, 
at 6 (1995) (“Whether or not there was a meaningful distinction to be drawn between the 
realm of philosophy and the world of commerce in the field of steroid chemistry in the 1960s, 
it is a very difficult distinction to maintain in biotechnology in the 1990s, with researchers in 
government and university laboratories seeking patent protection for their discoveries and with 
private firms developing research tools for commercial sale.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 288–89 (1977) (arguing that the patent system cannot grant a “meaningful 
property right around an explanation” provided by basic research). 
 124. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 79, at 1100 (discussing complexities of attempting 
to patent scientific discoveries). But see Nelson, supra note 79, at 105 (arguing that science can 
greatly decrease the cost of invention). 
 125. See Rushforth, supra note 46, at 510–12 (discussing market for research). 
 126. See Lawrence R. Velvel, A Critique of Brenner v. Manson, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 5, 
9–10 (1967) (arguing that patent claims with research use should be patentable just like claims 
with a commercial use). 
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to some product or process that might confer a benefit on the 
general public. 
Recognition of a normative bias against basic science is 
important; it frees Congress and the courts to either embrace or 
oppose basic science by varying utility requirements in a particular 
technological field. For example, to the extent the field is favored, 
practical utility could be made easier to prove. 
This policy lever can be implemented by courts but depends on 
usefulness being an interpreted statutory requirement, rather than a 
constitutional one. If “useful arts” is a term of art as a phrase,127 
usefulness is likely a statutory requirement.128 Of course, Congress 
can also clarify what “new and useful” means, but it has not done so. 
In re Brana129 is a good example of how courts can vary practical 
utility to achieve policy goals. There, the Federal Circuit upheld a 
patent on a chemical that might have been helpful for future cancer 
research, though experimental data was quite preliminary when the 
patent application was filed.130 The court ruled that Brana’s data was 
sufficient to show some future applied benefit to people; had the 
research related to some less desirable outcome—something it 
considered basic science—then it might have deemed the 
composition useful only for further research.131 
This may explain why there are plenty of research tools that are 
deemed worthy of patents, such as microscopes and test tubes.132 
While these tools might aid basic science, they also aid commercial 
development and manufacturing with very specific uses that more 
immediately benefit the public.133 Further, they are (for the most 
part) created using traditional raw materials and traditional 
manufacturing processes and are sold as commodities on the open 
market. Most disfavored research tools are created in laboratories 
 
 127. Walterscheid, supra note 10, at 52. 
 128. Cf. Machin, supra note 63, at 437–38 (arguing that usefulness means different 
things in constitution and statute); Velvel, supra note 126, at 13 (arguing that practical utility 
is a statutory requirement, not a constitutional bar). But see Oddi, supra note 90, at 1119–20 
(asserting that Brenner raises practical utility to an invariable constitutional level). 
 129. 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 130. Id. at 1568. 
 131. Id. at 1568–69. 
 132. See, e.g., Microscope, U.S. Patent No. 4,836,667 (filed May 4, 1987). 
 133. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] microscope has the 
specific benefit of optically magnifying an object to immediately reveal its structure.”). 
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using chemical processes and sold to other researchers using 
restrictive material transfer agreements. 
C. Practical Usefulness as a Commercialization Lever 
Some compositions are useful only as objects of further research 
because their creators have not yet discovered their practical use, if 
any. The practical usefulness doctrine denies patentability to such 
inventions due to lack of practical utility.134 It is tempting to accept 
anti-science bias as the sole explanation for unpatentability, but many 
such compositions are created by pharmaceutical companies and 
other commercial producers who hope to discover a commercial use 
in the future.135  
If a patent were allowed despite the lack of practical utility, then 
only the inventor could capitalize on new uses.136 Some argue that 
this is optimal for coordinating further research about uses137 or that 
the patent disclosure is sufficient to allow others to experiment to 
discover new uses.138 Others might say that a patent gives the 
patentee an incentive to discover a use and allows her to capture the 
benefit of what might ordinarily be unpatentable post-invention 
commercialization efforts.139 Still others might argue that patentees 
will sit on their rights and that competition is better, especially where 
patentees might block commercialization of new uses discovered by 
others.140 Further, because all uses are covered by a patent, society 
should make sure there is such a use before locking out others who 
might spend money to discover the use.141 
 
 134. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966). 
 135. Andrew T. Kight, Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility 
Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1021 (1998) (discussing time lag between 
discovery of a chemical and its commercial release). 
 136. As discussed in detail below, others can obtain patents on new uses, but the initial 
patentee can block commercialization of such uses. 
 137. Kitch, supra note 123, at 285–87. Note, though, that utility is still important, as 
barely useful inventions are unlikely to garner much commercialization effort. 
 138. Velvel, supra note 126, at 8–9; Rushforth, supra note 46, at 514–15. 
 139. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 366 (“[R]eward theory finds that protection is 
unnecessary for ex post commercialization efforts.”). 
 140. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 860–61 (1990). 
 141. Grady & Alexander, supra note 121, at 339–40 (explaining that where use is 
unknown, risk averse courts do not want to grant patents because they do not know what 
could happen downstream). 
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This Article is neutral with regard to these competing arguments. 
Rather it emphasizes that the timing of practical utility can be an 
important tool for driving commercialization of important 
discoveries, but the effect of the law is subject to normative 
considerations on each side of the argument. 
1. Commercialization arguments in favor of practical utility 
a. Practical utility and blocking patents. One normative reason to 
deny patentability to compositions of unknown use is to avoid 
inefficient blocking patents.142 A blocking patent stops future 
improvers from selling an invention because the underlying 
technology is patented by someone else.143 Thus, a patent on 
Chemical X will stop anyone who later discovers a use for Chemical 
X from selling it.144 This, of course, reduces the incentive for future 
researchers to discover a use for Chemical X, leaving the task solely 
to the original inventor, which may be economically inefficient.145 As 
a result, early filing rewards invention rather than commercialization 
such that “broad claims can impose unwarranted burdens on third-
party commercializers” who might exploit the invention to the 
public’s benefit.146 
Consider, for example, Brenner, where the alleged first inventor 
to create a new steroid did not discover a use for it.147 The later 
inventors discovered a beneficial use, which they subsequently 
disclosed in their patent application.148 Had the original inventor 
obtained a patent, research to find a new use might have stopped, 
and the benefits of the steroid would never have been discovered; 
indeed, the original inventor waited years without trying to find a 
use.149 Of course, discovery of the use might happen in any event; in 
Brenner, each researcher worked at roughly the same time, such that 
 
 142. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 870–71. 
 143. Id. at 860. 
 144. While one who discovers a new use for an existing composition is entitled to a 
patent under § 101, a patent only confers a right to exclude others from that use, not a right 
to make the underlying composition in the first place. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (infringement if 
one “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention”). 
 145. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140 at 870–71. 
 146. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 344. 
 147. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 521–22 (1966). 
 148. Id. at 520–21. 
 149. Id. (Manson filed in 1960, but claimed to invent in 1956). 
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granting a patent to the first inventor might not have thwarted 
discovery of the steroid’s use. This will not be true in every case, 
especially where an applicant files earlier than the first inventor in 
Brenner did. 
To be sure, all patents block others to some extent,150 but society 
may be more willing to tolerate blocking where the initial inventor 
has discovered some beneficial use for the new material.151 
In re Fisher152 provides an example of a blocking patent filed by a 
commercial entity. There, the applicant claimed (and assigned to a 
Monsanto Company subsidiary) five gene fragments called expressed 
sequence tags, or ESTs.153 An EST is not a complete gene—it is only 
a portion of the gene, but it can be used as a “gene probe” to 
determine what genes are present in a mixture of DNA.154 This is 
similar to a word processor search for “he” in a document where the 
search will find all instances of “the.” In Fisher, however, the 
applicant did not know the function of the gene from which the 
ESTs were extracted.155 Using the word processor analogy, the 
inventor could search for a sequence of letters “he,” but if the search 
found the word “helot,”156 he would have no idea if the search 
found a real word.157 Nonetheless, a patent on the fragment “he” 
would bar others who use the word “helot.” 
The applicant claimed that ESTs could be used in a variety of 
ways, such as “measuring the level of mRNA in a tissue sample” and 
“serving as a molecular marker for mapping the entire maize 
 
 150. Machin, supra note 63, at 438–39. 
 151. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 354 (discussing the role of blocking patents: “[A]ny 
activity following the initial invention that leads to a commercially available product or 
service—including developing, testing, manufacturing, sales, and service of the initial 
invention, as well as the invention and subsequent development of improvements—should be 
viewed as part of ongoing ‘commercialization’ of the original invention.”). 
 152. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 153. Id. at 1367. 
 154. Id. (“An EST is a short nucleotide sequence that represents a fragment of a cDNA 
clone . . . . When an EST is introduced into a sample containing a mixture of DNA, the EST 
may hybridize with a portion of DNA. Such binding shows that the gene corresponding to the 
EST was being expressed at the time of mRNA extraction.”). 
 155. Id. at 1368 (“Nevertheless, Fisher did not know the precise structure or function of 
either the genes or the proteins encoded for by those genes.”). 
 156. See Helot, OPEN DICTIONARY, http://open-dictionary.com/Helot (last visited Oct. 
13, 2010). 
 157. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1373 (“One of the claimed ESTs, by contrast, can only be used 
to detect the presence of genetic material having the same structure as the EST itself.”). 
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genome.”158 The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed a factual 
finding by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that the 
proffered uses had no practical utility because they were neither 
specific nor substantial.159 The proffered uses were not substantial 
because they had no presently available benefit to the public; they 
were instead useful to learn more about the genes from which they 
came.160 The suggested uses were also not specific because they were 
so vague as to be meaningless; any gene fragment could have been 
used for the same purposes.161 
It may be that some ESTs are useful as gene probes, and as such 
they should be patentable. However, gene probe functionality 
should be specifically described and enabled so that skilled 
researchers can determine which fragments will probe for which 
genes.162 It is important, though, that the patent also disclose the 
function of the underlying gene; a probe for a useless gene is also 
useless and a potentially inefficient block on future innovation. 
Further, the claims should be directed to “gene probes” rather 
than “DNA fragments” to reflect the disclosed use and its tie to 
novelty.163 Claims phrased as such should be interpreted to foreclose 
infringement claims against those who later use the underlying gene 
(which must necessarily include use of the fragment) for another 
purpose. Following these guidelines, gene probe ESTs would follow 
discovery of the entire gene and its function rather than precede it, 
stopping the use of gene fragments as blocking patents against those 
who discover the function of the underlying genes. 
 
 158. Id. at 1368. 
 159. Id. at 1379. 
 160. Id. at 1371 (“It thus is clear that an application must show that an invention is 
useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future 
date after further research.”). 
 161. Id. at 1374 (“Any EST transcribed from any gene in the maize genome has the 
potential to perform any one of the alleged uses. . . . Nothing about Fisher’s seven alleged uses 
set the five claimed ESTs apart from the more than 32,000 ESTs disclosed in the ’643 
application or indeed from any EST derived from any organism.”). 
 162. Id. at 1373 (“[A] claim directed to a polynucleotide disclosed to be useful as a ‘gene 
probe’ or ‘chromosome marker’ . . . fails to satisfy the specific utility requirement unless a 
specific DNA target is also disclosed.”). 
 163. Koneru, supra note 5, at 663–64 (explaining that ESTs should be patentable, but 
limited in scope such that entire genes and gene probes are not included within the ambit of 
the patent). 
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b. Practical utility and commercial development. Allowing patents 
before a use is discovered could impede the development of useful 
technical and market information. If such information need not be 
disclosed in the patent then there is less incentive to invest in its 
development.164 
Further, because investment in the commercial development of 
compounds may be considered unpatentable market experimentation 
rather than invention,165 allowing patents on unknown-use products 
might shift incentives toward investing in patentable inventive 
activities rather than unpatentable market experimentation, even 
though market experimentation may produce a larger social benefit. 
Searches for unknown-use compounds may be wasteful when 
scarce resources could be used to commercially develop known 
compounds. To be sure, inventors seek out new compounds because 
they expect profits in the future, but it may be more optimal to focus 
efforts on commercializing existing known-use products now rather 
than seeking patents on new compounds that might become 
beneficial later. 
If, however, unknown-use products are unpatentable, then 
market experimentation becomes more attractive, and thus better 
aligns private incentives with social welfare. On balance, requiring 
practical utility should cause companies to spend more on 
commercialization than they might if inventions could be patented 
without such usefulness. 
c. Practical utility and fraudulent commercialization. A final 
normative reason to disallow unknown use claims is to limit 
commercialization of non-beneficial products. For example, 
marketers might use a patent grant to imply that a product is both 
functional and beneficial.166 Practical utility becomes important given 
 
 164. Cotropia, supra note 73, at 95 (“This lack of technical and market information at 
early filing generates uncertainty about the future value of the invention and, in turn, the value 
of the patent-holder’s right of exclusivity.”). 
 165. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that commercial 
exploitation through market testing is not experimental use and can invalidate patent); Michael 
Abramowicz & John Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 337, 344 (2008) (“[T]he granting of intellectual property protection—specifically, 
patents—is not dependent upon the extent to which an innovation will promote market 
experimentation.”). 
 166. Mahler v. Animarium Co., 111 F. 530, 537 (8th Cir. 1901); ROBERT PATRICK 
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010 1:28:05 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
1228 
how lax the operable utility requirement is for most inventions; even 
pharmaceutical inventions do not require proof of human benefits 
prior to a patent grant.167 However, a practical utility requirement 
ensures that the minimal operable utility be related to some 
particular beneficial use. 
While this is not a concern for most pharmaceuticals because the 
FDA regulates such uses,168 there are a bevy of products that claim 
health benefits without any FDA approval. Without practical utility, 
these products might receive imprimatur of a patent without such 
regulation. Even though false advertising laws may forbid wrong-
doing, further encouraging commercialization of such products 
through early patenting may not benefit society. 
2. Commercialization arguments against practical utility 
a. Practical utility and patent races. Commercialization 
considerations do not solely favor a practical utility argument, 
however. Proponents of patent prospect theory argue that early 
patents might be economically beneficial because they allow a single 
owner to control and coordinate improvements.169 A patent thus 
incentivizes the owner to discover all of the possible uses and exploit 
them, whereas leaving the discovery unpatented will allow others to 
find uses and obtain a patent, reducing the incentive to create the 
discovery in the first place. 
A related argument is that the patent document is a public 
statement that a compound, even a practically useless one, is off-
limits. According to this argument, allowing an early patent avoids 
rent-seeking races to patent by informing others that they should 
stop duplicative work in a particular area. 
The patent prospecting argument has its limits. Development is 
often performed simultaneously and secretly. The first notice of a 
patent application would not surface until at least eighteen months 
after filing, much too late to stop parallel efforts.  
 
210–11 (4th ed. 2007); Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 5, at 5 (“[I]ssuance of a patent 
might mislead the public by appearing to represent a government imprimatur of the value of 
[the product].”). 
 167. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Kitch, supra note 123, at 285–87; F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and 
Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream 
Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 333 (2006); Merges & Nelson, supra note 140. 
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Further, granting early patents might actually exacerbate races by 
incentivizing rent-seeking efforts to patent as many unknown-use 
compounds as possible.170 Even if early patenting affects 
development efforts, it might only shift such efforts from discovering 
unknown compounds to discovering their use, which may still be less 
beneficial than commercializing known-use technology. Further, 
once a use is discovered, the original patentee would be able to block 
the inventor who discovers a use from commercializing the 
invention. 
b. Practical utility and patent terms. One benefit of allowing 
early patents on unknown-use inventions is that such patents expire 
earlier, releasing the knowledge to the public domain and allowing 
others to exploit the knowledge it reveals earlier.171  
However, the benefits of early expiration may not materialize. 
Granting patents with no known use may instead extend patent 
terms while limiting beneficial rivalrous commercialization. The 
reason lies in double patenting. Double patenting can occur when a 
patentee claims a product but then later files a new application 
claiming a use for a product. Because patent terms run from the date 
of filing, the later use claim would expire later, not earlier.  
Delayed expiration would be exacerbated by patents that have no 
practical use. The product patent would block others from the 
competitive race to find a use172 because competitors are not allowed 
to experiment on the patented compound;173 thus, the owner of the 
patent has no pressure to quickly discover a use or file a patent 
application on a new use. 
Courts do not allow such gaming of the system to achieve 
extended patent terms; as a result, double patenting is ordinarily 
 
 170. Grady & Alexander, supra note 121, at 339; Eggert, supra note 70, at 781.  
 171. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 878 (“[W]hen it comes to invention and 
innovation, faster is better.”); Duffy, supra note 31, at 444 (“Indeed, the earlier elimination of 
the patent right almost certainly has a social benefit because the end of the patent term also 
terminates any deadweight loss associated with the monopoly right.”); Eggert, supra note 70, 
at 782; Koneru, supra note 5, at 646–47. 
 172. Cf. Nelson, supra note 79, at 104 (discussing role of demand on race to invent). 
 173. This assumes that the patented product is not available on the market, which is a 
reasonable assumption where it has no use. Research tools that are available to others might be 
an exception to this analysis. See, e.g., Velvel, supra note 126, at 8–9 (arguing that others will 
experiment once a patent is published, and that they might find uses that are not blocked by 
the prior patent). 
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barred where the new use would have been obvious to the inventor 
at the time of the initial patent application on the product.174 Thus, 
where one tries to patent an obvious use in a second patent, the 
PTO and courts require that the later patent expire at the same time 
as the original product patent.175  
However, the double patenting rule does not apply to inventions 
with no obvious use. Indeed, if the use were obvious at the time of 
filing, then the patent would have practical utility, even if not 
disclosed in the patent document. Thus, it must be assumed that 
inventions without practical utility have no obvious use.  
As a result, any new uses discovered would not be subject to 
double patenting rules, allowing the second patent—the one 
claiming a use for the previously unknown use invention—to expire 
later than the original patent, which merely identified the unknown 
use product. This would lead to an extended patent term, tying up 
the technology for a longer period. Such a patent extension would 
negate any of the benefits of early patenting and create new costs 
associated with longer patent terms. 
3. Reconciling the considerations 
The contradictory commercialization arguments imply that the 
potential effect of allowing non-practical patents is difficult to 
discern. Resolving the conflicting views depends primarily on 
whether the invention will be made publicly available in the absence 
of patent protection and on whether patent disclosure by one spurs 
innovation by others during the term of the patent. 
For example, where a researcher discovers Glob X with no 
known use, there are three potential options for the information: 
patent, publish, or keep secret.  
If the discovery is considered patentable, then the arguments in 
favor of allowing an early patent described in Part IV apply. Further, 
disclosure of a new compound can have value for other researchers, 
 
 174. 3A-9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 9.01 (2009); Cohen & 
Schwartz, supra note 66, at 105 (“A double patenting situation may result if the compound is 
found to be patentable and the use claimed in the second application is an obvious use.”). 
 175. Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 F.3d 1373, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (“[A] claim to a method of using a composition is not patentably distinct from an earlier 
claim to the identical composition in a patent disclosing the identical use.”). 
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even if its use is not disclosed.176 As discussed in this Part, such 
arguments are not terribly persuasive. At best, such arguments might 
foster commercialization through coordination of research on future 
uses, at the cost of extending patent terms.  
If the discovery is published, then all can find new uses, and each 
discoverer can patent a discovered use. If the original inventor finds a 
use within one year,177 then she can obtain a patent on both the 
original product and the use. If more than a year passes, she would 
still be entitled to a patent on the newly discovered use, just like any 
other person who does so. Some might argue that this is unfair to 
academic researchers who must publish long before a use is found178 
while others would argue that disclosure and competition are best 
served by allowing free access to information.179 Bias against 
academic research is not a terribly persuasive argument because the 
United States provides more protection than any other country; 
outside the United States, grace periods are far more limited.180 
Thus, any researcher desiring an international patent may be unable 
to publish prior to filing, which limits the incentive to publish first 
and find a use later. 
Even if publication does not limit patentability, use patents are 
not as valuable as composition patents because use patents are more 
difficult to enforce181 and because composition claims cover all uses. 
This likely decreases others’ incentives to find uses after publication. 
If the discovery is kept secret, only the inventor will pursue 
finding new uses while others might simultaneously attempt to 
discover the compound and the use. This allows some potential 
coordination benefits similar to allowing a patent on the unknown-
 
 176. Machin, supra note 63, at 439 (explaining that society is better off allowing too 
many patents rather than keeping discoveries secret). 
 177. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2006) (barring patents on inventions published more than 
one year before date of application). 
 178. Johnson, supra note 54, at 314. But see Perryman & Setty, supra note 113, at 511 
(explaining that academia already faces pressure to patent prior to publishing due to 
international laws that require filing prior to public disclosure). 
 179. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 872 (“We have trouble with the view that 
coordinated development is better than rivalrous. In principle it could be, but in practice it 
generally is not.”). 
 180. Toshiko Takenaka, Rethinking the United States First-to-Invent Principle from a 
Comparative Law Perspective: A Proposal to Restructure § 102 Novelty and Priority Provisions, 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 626–27 (2002). 
 181. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 914; Zuhn, supra note 13, at 997. 
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use discovery because the inventor can license others to find a use in 
secret. However, it has none of the potential public disclosure 
benefits, to the extent there are any.182 There is also a chance the 
inventor will not find the best use and/or will abandon the research 
altogether.183 Additionally, any resulting patent will expire no earlier 
than if a patent were allowed on Glob X even without practical 
utility. 
These three choices illustrate that practical utility’s 
commercialization effects are based on underlying assumptions about 
the value of disclosure, exclusive rights, and simultaneous competing 
efforts. The Brenner Court, for example, explicitly asserted that the 
patent disclosure added little value, that inventors would likely not 
keep the information secret, but would instead coordinate 
development by contracting with others to discover new uses for 
unpatentable substances.184 Others have criticized these assumptions, 
pointing to publishing pressures and lack of coordination of 
unpatented information, among other things.185 
The choice between sharing information and keeping it secret 
may also reveal an implicit reason why basic science and research 
tools might not be patentable. If academics, a primary source of such 
knowledge, have no commercialization incentives, then denying 
practical utility may best serve societal interest by allowing all to 
commercialize information that would have been developed and 
published anyway. As universities increase their focus on 
commercializing the inventions of their faculties,186 one might expect 
publishing norms to change, a trend that has already been 
observed.187 
Additional policy considerations apply because patent expiration 
is the same under the patent and trade secret option. Disclosure with 
 
 182. Velvel, supra note 126, at 5 (explaining that practical utility rule disincentivizes 
disclosure). 
 183. Machin, supra note 63, at 439–40. 
 184. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533–34 (1966). 
 185. Velvel, supra note 126, at 7 (arguing that inventors will keep information secret, 
contrary to assumption in Brenner); Rushforth, supra note 46, at 503–05 (explaining that the 
solution to inadequate disclosure is requiring better disclosure, not barring patents that 
disclose new chemicals without a known use). 
 186. Most universities own inventions made by their faculties. They might seek to 
commercialize such inventions for profit and pay royalties to the inventors. 
 187. Perryman & Setty, supra note 113, at 511 (discussing pressure to patent before 
publishing). 
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exclusive rights associated with the patent might better induce 
commercialization, but not necessarily. If trade secret law allows for 
strong enforcement of license agreements, then inventors may be 
just as willing to contract out commercialization as they would with 
a patent. Of course, patenting allows for non-contracting parties to 
find new uses, so patenting might be preferred. The optimal policy 
will depend on how one views trade secret law, experimental use 
exceptions, reverse engineering costs, and blocking patents.188 
In all events, the practical utility standard will have a significant 
effect on commercialization paths and likelihoods. It is unlikely that 
decisions can be made with respect to each patent, and so policy 
makers—probably courts189 but potentially Congress—must make 
rules that will apply in different generalized circumstances. In areas 
(or for particular types of patentees) where one expects vigorous 
discovery and exploitation of use, attachment of practical utility at an 
earlier stage might be preferred.190 In areas where exploitation is 
limited or unknown, granting early utility might be detrimental to 
commercialization incentives.  
This distinction may explain some of the case law. Single 
chemicals with no known use and no ongoing study have generally 
been denied patentability,191 while applicants that can show an 
ongoing research project with some results, even if preliminary, are 
more likely to receive protection.192 
Finally, these considerations lend themselves to potentially 
dividing the practical utility pie. For example, the law could provide 
separate claims for the process of making a non-useful product, and 
later allow claims for newly discovered uses of the product without 
 
 188. Compare Velvel, supra note 126, at 8–9 (explaining that blocking and 
experimentation are not a problem), with Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 909 
(discussing problems associated with blocking patents). 
 189. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 95. 
 190. Duffy, supra note 31, at 444 (discussing savings associated with ending patent races 
early). 
 191. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 192. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“We perceive no 
insurmountable difficulty, under appropriate circumstances, in finding that the first link in the 
screening chain, in vitro testing, may establish a practical utility for the compound in 
question.”); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Usefulness in patent law, and 
in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of 
further research and development. The stage at which an invention in this field becomes useful 
is well before it is ready to be administered to humans.”). 
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ever granting a patent on the product itself.193 Courts could 
implement such a division under the statute as the creation process 
does have a use—namely the creation of a new chemical.194 Indeed, 
the discovering a new composition and its manufacturing method 
may be highly novel and non-obvious. There may be many reasons 
to incentivize disclosure of such methods as early as possible, such as 
making them public so that others can find alternative ways to make 
the product or find uses for the product.195 However, to the extent 
that such new compositions may only be created by a single process, 
then a how-to-make patent would coincide with a product patent 
and lead to the same costs. Further, to the extent that such processes 
are discovered and published anyway, then no additional incentive 
may be needed to encourage disclosure. 
V. INTRODUCING COMMERCIAL UTILITY 
Because utility is not well understood, efforts to improve the 
commercial prospects of inventions rarely focus on utility. Instead, 
scholars look to other patentability criteria196 or even suggest new 
forms of intellectual property protection.197 Even if practical utility is 
viewed as a commercialization tool as discussed in Part IV, it is an 
indirect one that only applies to particular types of inventions. 
 
 193. Eggert, supra note 70, at 785 (proposing “howtomake” and “howtouse” patents). 
But see Knutson v. Gallsworthy, 164 F.2d 497, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (“It may very well be 
that the two counts are so distinct as that the holder of a patent on the generic ‘composition of 
matter’ is entitled to state separately in the same patent a claim to specified uses of the same 
substance; and, in that sense, the two claims may be patentably distinct. But it does not follow 
that they are so distinct as to authorize the issuance of separate patents to separate persons.”). 
 194. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 180–81 (C.C.P.A. 1960); J.C. Holman, Case Note, 
Patents—Sufficiency of Disclosure—Utility Requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 for Chemical Process 
Claims—In re Manson, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 78, 80–81 (1964). 
 195. Eggert, supra note 70, at 782; see supra note 171. 
 196. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 165, at 399–404 (discussing application of patent 
doctrine, such as the paper patent rule, to market experimentation); Cotropia, supra note 73, 
at 119 (suggesting an actual reduction to practice requirement); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights 
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 721–23 (2001) 
(relaxing practical utility requirements might aid commercialization); Kitch, supra note 123, at 
280–83 (discussing obviousness); id. at 287–88 (explaining that purpose of disclosure is to 
stake prospect claims for future commercialization); Abramowicz, supra note 79, at 1109 
(patent extensions); Sichelman, supra note 2, at 395 (discussing working requirements). 
 197. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 402 (suggesting a new “commercialization patent” that 
rewards commercialization efforts); Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 165, at 405 (discussing 
“commercialization patents”). 
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This Article argues that a direct commercial utility requirement 
would provide an additional and better method to incentivize 
commercialization than new or collateral requirements. Usefulness is 
currently required by statute, so a different gloss may not require 
legislative input. Further, courts have developed a legal framework 
for considering other categories of utility, such as the determination 
of when inventions are reduced to practice. Thus, a new category of 
usefulness can be integrated with existing precedent relatively easily 
compared with sui generis commercialization proposals. 
While commercial utility has never been required by the 
courts,198 such a requirement would certainly affect 
commercialization efforts, even if it might also create some offsetting 
social costs. This Part first shows that commercial utility is a viable 
alternative under the statute. Indeed, it might well have been 
intended by Congress more than 170 years ago. Second, it 
introduces a doctrinal test for commercial utility. Third, it discusses 
potential benefits and weaknesses of a commercial utility test. 
A. Commercial Utility Is Lost to History 
It is an accident of history that patentability does not directly 
hinge on commercial usefulness. Little attention has been given to 
why utility rules developed the way they did and what might have 
happened in the alternative. Accepting that Congress intended that 
utility have some teeth more than 150 years ago advances 
understanding about how utility might be better used to incentivize 
commercialization today. Indeed, had Congressional intent been 
implemented by the courts following the 1836 Patent Act, the 
current statute might well have had a form of commercial utility 
requirement.  
A brief review of utility’s history reveals where intent and practice 
diverged. It also shows that, even under the 1952 Act, usefulness 
might have been interpreted to have included a commercial utility 
requirement because the official comment implies that the express 
requirement was only omitted due to obscure meaning and non-
use.199  
 
 198. See Utility Requirement, supra note 5, at 165–66. For some time, however, 
commercial success served as evidence of utility. Id. at 161. 
 199.  P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 161, 197 (1993) (originally published in 1954). 
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Usefulness appeared three times in the first patent statute, the 
1790 Patent Act.200 The statute provided that 1) a patent may be 
granted for “useful” inventions or discoveries; 2) one must include a 
description sufficient to enable one to use the invention;201 and 3) 
designated cabinet members must “deem the invention or discovery 
sufficiently useful and important.”202 Thus, patents were to be issued 
only after an examination of utility and importance.203 
Implementation of the “sufficiently useful and important” 
requirement was administratively difficult and thus did not last 
long.204 It was eliminated in the 1793 Patent Act,205 though the 
requirements of usefulness and enablement remained. Further, 
examination requirements were eliminated altogether, and patents 
were granted to all who applied.206 
It was during this un-examined registration period that Justice 
Story issued his famous opinions in Lowell and Bedford.207 Justice 
Story had no “sufficiently useful and important” language to guide 
his interpretation of the statute; indeed, that phrase’s absence in the 
1793 Act supports his interpretation that—at that time—an 
invention did not need to be important, but merely operable and 
practically useful in some way. 
The lack of examination did not sit well with Congress, so the 
Patent Act of 1836 introduced an examination system.208 As part of 
this system, in addition to the usefulness and enablement 
requirements, the Commissioner of Patents was to issue patents for 
inventions “if [he] shall deem it to be sufficiently useful and 
important.”209 It appears that Congress inserted this text in specific 
response to Justice Story’s more lenient test, which had been 
generally adopted by courts by 1836. The committee report, often 
called the “Ruggles Report,” stated:  
 
 200. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 201. Id. § 2. 
 202. Id. § 1. 
 203. McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1821). 
 204. Id. (“The investigations, however, at the departments, necessarily summary, were 
found inconvenient in practice, and the act now in force abolished them . . . .”). 
 205. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318–23 (1793) (repealed 1836). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See supra notes 14 and 15. 
 208. S. REP. NO. 24-239 (1836) [hereinafter Ruggles Report]. 
 209. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (repealed 1870). 
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The necessary consequence is, that patents have, under the act of 
1793, been daily granted without regard to the question of 
novelty, or even utility in the ordinary sense; for it has been settled 
that the term useful, as used in this statute, is only in 
contradistinction to hurtful, injurious or pernicious . . . . 
The most obvious, if not the only means of effecting [a change to 
the evils of the registration system which resulted in devaluation of 
patents], appears to be to establish a check upon the granting of 
patents, allowing them to issue only for such invention as are in fact 
new and entitled, by the merit of originality and utility, to be 
protected by law.210 
Thus, the 1836 Patent Act might have been interpreted to 
require an elevated level of utility—perhaps even commercial utility 
in the discretion of the Commissioner. In all events, utility was to 
require more than the “non-pernicious” Lowell rule.  
A more stringent utility requirement was rarely enforced, 
however. Though the Commissioner of Patents was aware of the 
change, he opted for a narrow interpretation that allowed more 
patents. The first Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents 
after the 1836 Act stated: 
Power is given to the Commissioner to refuse a patent, if the 
invention is not deemed sufficiently useful; but this power is 
seldom exercised, and is confined to cases where the patent may be 
in some way injurious, the improvement frivolous, or where an 
attempt is made to avoid a prior patent. It is the intention of the 
Commissioner to err (if at all) on the side of liberality, leaving the 
parties affected to the courts, to contest their doubtful rights.211 
This important report—the only one to mention the 
requirement—reveals some important information about the 
“sufficiently useful” provision. First, the Commissioner clearly 
understood the statute to grant a new discretionary power. Second, 
that power was to be different than prior utility definitions. Third, 
even with restraint, the Commissioner did occasionally deny patents. 
Fourth, the Commissioner made a deliberate decision to limit the 
reach of the statute. 
 
 210. Ruggles Report, supra note 208 (emphasis added). 
 211. Patent Office: Annual Report from the Commissioner of Patents, at 1–2 (Jan. 17, 
1838). 
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Rather than apply the sufficiently useful requirement as 
envisioned by the Commissioner, the courts quickly gutted the 
“sufficiently useful and important” requirement. Instead, judicial 
opinions held that Justice Story’s conception of utility survived 
despite the additional “sufficiently useful and important” language212 
and determined that the Commissioner’s determinations of 
patentability were essentially reviewable de novo.213 Congress had an 
opportunity to clarify this interpretation in the 1870 Patent Act, but 
instead kept the statutory language essentially unchanged.214 
Part of the justification for limiting the Commissioner’s 
discretion was that juries would not review Commissioner 
decisions215 and courts were wary of allowing the executive to impose 
discretionary decisions without an appeal to a jury. However, if the 
Administrative Procedure Act,216 which today allows for extensive 
 
 212. In re Aiken, 1 F. Cas. 227, 229 (C.C.D.C. 1850) (“The decision of the 
commissioner . . . rest[s] only upon the commissioner’s opinion that the invention was not 
‘sufficiently useful and important.’ The degree of usefulness or importance is not described or 
limited by the statute . . . . If good may be the result of granting a patent, and evil cannot, I 
should think it ought to be granted . . . .”); In re Seely, 21 F. Cas. 1016, 1018 (C.C.D.C. 
1853) (relying on Curtis treatise to rule that “sufficiently useful and important” means “non-
injurious”); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 548–49 (1870) (“[T]he requirement of the 
patent act in that respect is satisfied if . . . the machine is capable of being beneficially used for 
the purpose for which it was designed . . . .”); Gibbs v. Hoefner, 19 F. 323, 324 
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1884) (“If it was useful in any degree, no matter how infinitesimal, the court 
would not be justified in declaring the patent void.”); Haynes Stellite Co. v. Chesterfield, 22 
F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1927) (“[E]ven in the softer grades [the claimed alloy] was 
sufficiently useful to support patentability.”). 
 213. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 355 (1875) (“Upon the proposition that the 
decision of the commissioner on the question of invention, its utility and importance, is 
conclusive, and that the same is not open to examination in the courts, we are unanimously of 
the opinion that the proposition is unsound. His decision in the allowance and issue of a 
patent creates a prima facie right only . . . .”). Reckendorfer was a case about obviousness, 
which is arguably different than a determination about sufficient usefulness and importance, a 
determination more directly left to the commissioner’s discretion in the statute. But see id. at 
351 (“It is nowhere declared in the statute that the decision of the commissioner, as to the 
extent of the utility or importance of the improvement, shall be conclusive upon that point; 
but, in the section just quoted, it is placed in the same category with the want of novelty and 
the other requisites of the statute . . . .”). 
 214. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§ 24, 26, 31, 16 Stat. 198–217 (1870) (repealed 
1952) (setting forth “new and useful,” “make and use,” and “sufficiently useful and 
important” requirements, respectively). 
 215. Aiken, 1 F. Cas. at 229. 
 216. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006). 
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discretionary jurisdiction without an appeal to a jury,217 existed in 
1850, the discretion of the Commissioner may have been given 
much more weight.218 Ironically, the Supreme Court later relied on 
the Commissioner’s supposed discretion to grant patents only if an 
invention were “sufficiently useful” when it determined that the 
Secretary of the Interior had no jurisdiction to overrule the 
Commissioner’s discretion.219  
The 1952 Patent Act eliminated the “sufficiently useful and 
important” requirement220 and instead only required inventions to 
be “new and useful,”221 as well as requiring applicants to describe 
how to use the invention.222 Legislative history shows that the phrase 
was omitted because it was “unnecessary”223 and because “[t]he 
meaning of this old phrase was obscure and it had seldom been 
resorted to either in the Patent Office or in the courts.”224 
Despite this claim in the history, it is not clear that elevated 
utility was unanimously disregarded prior to the 1952 Act.225 Some 
courts were still willing—in dicta at least—to require a higher utility 
threshold,226 as were patent examiners.227 The Patent Office had even 
 
 217. For example, patent denials today are appealed directly from the PTO to the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 218. See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2008–2009) (“Throughout the twentieth century, 
administrative law and intellectual property law seemed as if they were hermetically sealed off 
from each other in both theory and practice.”). 
 219. Butterworth v. United States, 112 U.S. 50, 65–67 (1884) (“By [the Patent Act of 
1836] it was declared to be the duty of the Commissioner to issue a patent if he ‘shall deem it 
to be sufficiently useful and important,’ the very discretion previously vested in the three heads 
of Departments by the act of 1790 . . . .”). 
 220. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1952). 
 221. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 222. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952). 
 223. S. REP. NO. 82–1979, at 16 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2413. 
 224. P. J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 161, 197 (1993) (originally published in 1954). 
 225. Utility Requirement, supra note 5, at 158 (arguing that utility should require 
positive benefit rather than merely non-frivolousness). 
 226. In re Appeals of Drawbaugh, 9 App. D.C. 219, 239–40 (D.C. Cir. 1896) (“It is 
incumbent upon [the applicant] not only to comply with all the conditions and provisions of 
the statute, but, in the language of the statute, to make it appear that he is justly entitled to a 
patent under the law, and that the invention is sufficiently useful and important to justify the 
issue of such patent therefor.”). 
 227. Fletcher v. Watson, 204 F.2d 68, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (Examiner rejected patent on 
basis “that the claims are drawn to subject matter which is not sufficiently useful and important 
to support a patent.”). 
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used the test to reject applications.228 Indeed, the removal of the 
“sufficiently useful” requirement caused confusion among examiners 
right after the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.229 In fact, Judge Rich, 
one of the principal authors of the 1952 Act, wanted to avoid this 
confusion, and stated that the section “was in fact deleted because of 
the possibility that . . . it might be construed as imposing some 
limitation on the statutory requirements for patentability over and 
above the requirements [for utility novelty, and nonobviousness] in 
sections 101, 102, and 103.”230 
Thus, while the sufficiency test was never widely implemented 
and was nominally repealed, this result was a historical accident. If 
the Commissioner of Patents and the few judges considering the 
issue early on had instead interpreted the statute more broadly, then 
a heightened utility requirement—perhaps even a commercial utility 
standard—might have emerged. 
This historical review does not imply that the rules should have 
included a commercial utility requirement, but rather that they could 
have included one. Recognition that the 1952 Act did not intend to 
eliminate the “sufficiently useful and important” requirement for any 
reason other than disuse over time allows courts (and certainly 
Congress) to interpret usefulness as it was originally intended in 
1836 by introducing a commercial utility requirement. 
B. Defining Commercial Utility 
1. A two-pronged standard 
The proposed test would find commercial utility present with 
sufficient evidence231 to convince a person with skill in the art that a) 
there is a market for the invention, and that b) the invention can be 
 
 228. In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 815 (C.C.P.A. 1959). 
 229. Id. (“[T]he rejection . . . is predicated solely on a theory of patentability we find to 
be outside of the patent statutes, namely, that the [claimed invention] is . . . no better than the 
[prior art]. . . . While [the former statute] may be said to have given the Commissioner some 
discretion in refusing to grant a patent on an otherwise patentable invention unless ‘the same is 
sufficiently useful and important,’ [the new statute removed that requirement, such that §101 
solely governs the question].”).  
 230. Giles Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 398 (1960). 
 231. Like other utility demonstrations, this requirement for evidence can presumably be 
satisfied if one with skill in the art believes that the invention has some sort of utility. 
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manufactured at a cost sufficient to fulfill market demand.232 Given 
that more than 50% of patents wind up being worthless,233 an initial 
review to determine which patents are most likely to be worthless 
should be practically achievable. 
The test would be applied in a manner similar to that of operable 
and practical utility, such that expectations justify utility even if the 
expectations prove incorrect in hindsight. Furthermore, no invention 
is complete without commercial utility. Thus, if a person with skill in 
the art would not expect the invention to be manufacturable in 
commercial quantities as of the filing date,234 then the patent would 
not issue even if the patentee proves skeptics wrong.235 However, 
because it is based on expectations, the test does not require actual 
commercial production, which might conflict with rules that penalize 
sales of patented inventions before filing. Likewise, a patent expected 
to succeed would not be void simply because a product 
incorporating the patent flops in the market. 
The first factor seems straightforward: in order to be 
commercially useful, some group of people must want to purchase it. 
The primary doctrinal oddity is that a person having skill in the art of 
the invention will not necessarily be an economist or some other 
specialist with sufficient information to assess market demand. As a 
result, the test would likely be applied as a determination a skilled 
artisan would make with the benefit of information from those who 
know about market demand. The quality of evidence required is 
discussed further below. 
The second factor constrains the result somewhat, by only 
allowing a finding of commercial utility where there is evidence that 
near-term market demand can be satisfied. In other words, the factor 
 
 232. Nelson, supra note 79, at 108 (explaining that anticipated future demand drives 
incentives to invest in research and development). 
 233. See Moore, supra note 2, at 1526 (arguing that “[r]enewal rate data is a better 
predictor of patent value than litigation data,” and since 53.71% of patentees allow their 
patents to expire by refusing to pay the $900 maintenance fee, this strongly suggests that these 
patents are worthless). 
 234. More technically, utility must be present in order to prove that the invention was 
reduced to practice, which must occur on or before the filing date. 
 235. Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(affirming the Board of Patent Appeals’ decision to deny an inventor priority based on prior 
patent applications because “none of the applications filed [previously] ‘would have enabled a 
person of ordinary skill . . . to treat human prostate cancer [by using the proposed 
invention]).’” 
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bars inventions that will remain so expensive to reproduce for such a 
long period of time that many who might want to purchase the 
invention are unable to obtain it. 
The commercial utility requirement embraces not only 
inventions of stand-alone consumer goods, but also non-consumer 
products, components of more complex products, and even 
methods. For each type of invention, the question will be the same: 
can it be delivered to or practiced by a sufficient market at a market-
clearing price? Inventors of components may have more difficulty 
because they must show that the cost of the component will not 
drive up the price of the end-product so much as to make it non-
competitive. Processes must show that there is at least some 
competitive advantage as compared to alternatives. 
Additionally, the cost prong need not be limited to end-
products. Inventions that aid in the distribution, delivery, or 
manufacture of end-products so as to reduce market prices could be 
considered commercially useful. 
The doctrinal test is theoretically elegant. It draws on the 
intersection of supply and demand that leads to a market clearing 
price. In that sense, commercial utility comes closest to the 
economic definition of utility, here measured by consumer surplus. 
Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount consumers 
are willing to pay for a good and the price they actually pay. The first 
prong of the test represents the amount consumers are willing to 
pay, and the second prong represents the price that suppliers are 
willing to accept. Thus, inventions that increase consumer surplus by 
increasing demand (that is, increasing the quantity consumers are 
willing to buy at a given price) or supply (that is, increasing the 
quantity sellers are willing to produce at any given price) should be 
commercially useful. 
However, despite the apparent elegance of the two prong 
standard, positive consumer surplus—even if one could master the 
difficult task of defining and measuring a market—cannot replace the 
doctrinal test suggested here for two reasons. First, supply is 
traditionally based on marginal cost, but new inventions may require 
high fixed costs that preclude commercial sales at any price. Even so, 
the patentee will always argue that she is willing to supply the 
product at a high price. Second, a few people will usually be willing 
to pay high costs for new products. As a result, there will almost 
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always be some consumer surplus so long as one person is willing to 
pay more than the marginal cost of a good.  
Thus, the more general “sufficient people willing to buy at a 
reasonable cost” test must be used. Further, evidence presented to 
satisfy the test must be objective to avoid unsupported subjective 
claims about market demand and production capabilities. While the 
commercial utility test requires de minimis utility, it does require 
both sufficient profit expectations by a reasonable producer to justify 
recovery of fixed costs and market demand of more than a handful of 
people. Otherwise, the test would be rendered illusory. Even if 
objective, the evidence may still be difficult to judge. Hence, the 
difficult practical question, then, is determining whether enough 
transactions are expected to satisfy the two prongs. That is, even if 
more than one potential sale is required, a few wealthy people might 
be willing to spend a large sum of money to purchase some 
expensive products; there was a time thirty years ago when video 
cassette recorders cost more than $1,000. 
Nonetheless, difficulty in applying a standard should not stand in 
the way of important policy. Obviousness, for example, is 
notoriously difficult to apply, yet it is one of the more important 
patent quality standards available to the PTO and the courts. 
There are two responses to these evidentiary concerns that might 
allow commercial utility to be at least as effective as obviousness. 
First, many inventions simply cannot be built at a price that even the 
wealthiest individuals will pay, especially where fixed costs and input 
costs are very high. These are the easy cases, and accepting this as a 
rule might provide sufficient benefits (even if it would allow too 
many patents) because it would keep administrative costs lower. 
There are other bright lines that might be drawn, but each is likely 
to be unsatisfying for one of several reasons. In general, any fixed 
rule will likely be either over- or under-inclusive and disconnected 
from business realities for some technologies. 
Second and alternatively, the PTO and courts can make 
determinations based on the type of technology, the state of the art, 
and the evidence available on a case by case basis. For example, some 
consumer product inventions might be commercially useful at a high 
cost, while a component used in such systems might only be 
commercially useful at a much lower cost. The determination would 
be based on manufacturing, distribution, and alternative 
technologies for each invention. 
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This sort of standard would be more costly to apply, but would 
also allow for much better accuracy than any particular rule—
especially because a fixed rule might be impossible to design.236 
Thus, a standard would be most appropriate where the benefits of 
denying commercially worthless patents and encouraging early 
commercialization outweigh the administrative costs of a 
discretionary standard. These benefits and costs are discussed further 
below. 
In any event, either a standard or a rule would still be subject to 
de minimis evidentiary requirements. However, the required quality 
of evidence might be tweaked to achieve optimal incentives. For 
example, the PTO or courts might accept inventor declarations 
based on reasonable expectations about market demand and 
manufacturing costs. Alternatively, they might require detailed and 
substantiated market research and manufacturing bids to prove 
commercial potential. In either case, the amount of commercial 
usefulness required for patent eligibility would be the same, but 
acceptance of the proffered evidence might be more difficult in the 
latter case. This is similar to current evidentiary standards for 
practical and operable usefulness. Pharmaceuticals require different 
evidence than mechanical inventions because of the different types of 
technologies involved and the credibility of evidence that a claim will 
operate as described. 
Alternatively, because there are two prongs to the standard, the 
quality of evidence might be considered on a sliding scale. Highly 
credible evidence of demand might forgive undeveloped evidence of 
manufacturing potential. Speculative evidence of demand might be 
acceptable if low manufacturing cost can be proven. A sliding scale 
seems reasonable—if a product can be made extremely inexpensively, 
then arguably some number of people will be willing to buy it, 
making it commercially useful, even if barely. 
By using a standard and varying the quality of evidence required, 
policy makers can control the amount of incentives inventors have to 
develop information about either the demand or the manufacturing 
prong (or both).237  
 
 236. See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing rules versus standard debate for allowing 
patents). 
 237. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 873 (“The real problem is not controlling 
overfishing, but preventing underfishing after exclusive rights have been granted.”). 
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However, care must be used to avoid requiring too much. If the 
barriers to patenting in an area become too great, inventive research 
may be channeled into other areas. This may be a desired outcome in 
some technologies, but in others it may dissuade valuable research 
that might eventually become extraordinarily valuable. At some 
point, pushing the commercialization incentive too far may cause 
abandonment. 
Further, requiring too much evidence could transform a de 
minimis requirement into a less preferred “working requirement,” 
which requires the patent owner to practice the invention.238 In this 
context, a working requirement would mandate that the invention 
already be in production prior to patentability. Such a rule would 
conflict with the on-sale and public-use bars, which deny patents 
covering inventions put to use more than a year prior to filing. The 
conflict is exacerbated if the inventor desires a foreign patent, as 
most foreign jurisdictions either forego or limit the one year grace 
period and disallow many patents which are in use prior to the filing 
date.239 Furthermore, in addition to diverting research into other 
areas, a working requirement might delay any remaining patent 
filings too much. The discussion below addresses the costs of 
delaying patent filings. 
2. Doctrinal and practical concerns 
There are a few doctrinal and practical concerns associated with 
the proposed commercial usefulness requirement. For example, 
commercial utility might cause some doctrinal confusion with the 
“will it work” prong of operable utility and “immediate benefit” 
prong of practical utility. However, this confusion need not 
undermine the new requirement. Operability should not be confused 
with commercialization.240 Operability requires only that the claimed 
invention work in the abstract, while commercial utility would 
 
 238. Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to 
Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 437 (2002) (explaining Article 5 of the 
Paris Convention, which allows member governments to force the use of a patent in order to 
“protect intellectual property from being suppressed or neglected . . . simply because the 
owner is unwilling or unable to exploit it.”). 
 239. Takenaka, supra note 180, at 626–27. 
 240. Most commercialized inventions must be operable, but not necessarily. A perpetual 
motion machine might have market demand but fail to operate with respect to the novel 
aspects of the invention. 
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require it to be reproduced and distributed cheaply enough so that a 
market will likely form.241 Take, for example, a pharmaceutical 
patent. In vitro tests are sufficient to show operable utility but may 
not be sufficient to show that the product can be manufactured. 
Instead, the inventor would have to show that the compound at 
issue is similar to other compounds that can be manufactured. 
Presumably, this would be relatively easy to show.  
Additionally, there may be more overlap between market 
demand and practical utility. Preliminary product testing sufficient to 
show practical utility’s immediate benefit may also support a finding 
of commercial utility’s market demand. This is almost certainly true 
in pharmaceuticals, but may not be true for the dishwasher/dining 
table combination,242 where there is undeniable practical benefit, but 
where people may not be willing to pay for such benefit. 
Showing consumer demand is further complicated by the train 
paradox. Proverbial railroad officials must decide if there should be a 
noon train. To find out, they visit the platform at noon. Surprisingly, 
there are no customers waiting at noon, and the officials conclude 
that there is no demand for a noon train. The paradox, of course, is 
that passengers will not visit the train station if there is no train 
scheduled. 
Similarly, consumers may not know enough about a new product 
to know that they would be willing to pay for it. This is especially 
true of some of the most important inventions that change the way 
we look at the world, such as polypropylene or even the television.243  
These practical difficulties in showing demand need not be a 
detriment to the test. As discussed further below, market research 
can generate important information, and patents currently do not 
protect investments in such research. The commercial usefulness 
requirement treats inventions—especially pioneering ones—as 
incomplete until the threshold is met. Thus, inventors must research 
 
 241. Electro-Dynamic Co. v. U.S. Light & Heat Corp., 278 F. 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1921) 
(explaining the invention is operable even though it had not been put to any commercial use); 
Machin, supra note 63, at 448 (“Evidence of commercial success will frequently provide 
evidence of utility, but commercial failure will never be evidence of a lack of utility.”). But see 
Utility Requirement, supra note 5, at 165–66 (discussing cases where commercial failure was 
evidence of inoperability). 
 242. U.S. Patent No. 5,687,752 (filed Nov. 15, 1995). 
 243. Kitch, supra note 123, at 272 (discussing television patented in 1905 and 
commercialized in 1940). 
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and develop inventions to the point that consumers would demand 
them prior to filing for a patent. This would allow inventors to 
capture otherwise unprotected value in developing a new market by 
extending the patent term.244  
Furthermore, because the invention is not considered complete 
until commercial usefulness is known, such market research would be 
considered pre-completion “experimental use” in order to avoid 
patent invalidation due to public disclosure of the invention prior to 
seeking a patent.245 By allowing patents despite traditionally 
invalidating market research, companies will have more of an 
incentive to conduct such important commercialization activities. 
The dishwasher/dining table246 and calendar underwear247 
discussed above can illustrate the commercial utility test at work. 
Evidence that the table could be manufactured at a reasonable price 
might be difficult to come by. The dishwasher would require 
insulation all around it, as well as a variety of different panels to 
match specific table materials. Manufacturing is not the primary 
problem, however. Rather, it would likely be difficult to show 
demand for the table. Aside from the basic shortcoming that nobody 
wants such an apparently silly invention are the costs associated with 
actually installing the table. Not only would the dishwasher be more 
expensive than under-counter dishwashers due to materials, but it 
would require both plumbing and power in the floor at the location 
of the table, which would significantly limit acceptance. While 
market demand may sometimes be unpredictable, the threshold is 
low enough that marginally commercial inventions should pass 
muster. The dishwasher likely would not, however, absent some 
evidence to the contrary. 
On the other hand, the calendar underwear could likely be 
manufactured easily. However, such manufacturing would certainly 
cost more than competitive (standard) underwear, including 
decorative “day of the week” panties. The question is whether there 
is a critical mass of consumers that would want to pay sufficiently 
more for underwear with a calendar. This is especially difficult where 
 
 244. Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 165, at 409–10. 
 245. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that carpet fresh 
patent was invalid due to public market testing). 
 246. ’752 Patent. 
 247. U.S. Patent No. 5,606,748 (filed Jan. 29, 1996). 
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actually keeping track of the date requires looking at or wearing dirty 
underwear (presumably, the calendar markings described in the 
patent would be lost in the wash) and because viewing the date 
requires disrobement (the calendar must have a use other than 
decoration). The inventor might overcome these burdens by 
showing, for example, that the calendar is implemented in such a 
way that it does not lose value in the washing machine. 
C. Benefits and Costs of Commercial Utility 
Implementing a commercial utility standard would provide many 
benefits but would also bring offsetting costs. On the whole, the 
new standard should promote social welfare, though this conclusion 
is not beyond debate. 
1. Potential benefits 
The benefits of a commercial utility requirement are manifold. 
First, costly and uncertain commercialization efforts248 would be 
protected by the resulting patent. Such efforts would not be 
patentable in themselves, but they would be necessary to obtain a 
patent. As a result, they would be considered “experimental use,” 
and thus would not invalidate the patent when done before the 
patent filing. This has the effect of allowing patentees to file their 
patent applications after a longer period of development. A result of 
such later filing is that patent terms would last long enough for the 
inventor to fully commercialize the patent.249 For example, later 
patenting allows time for necessary complementary technologies to 
be developed or improved before the patent expires.250 In fact, the 
patent would be premature until such complementary technologies 
were available. Inventors could then better reap the rewards of the 
 
 248. Kitch, supra note 123, at 276–77 (explaining that competitors can easily copy 
results of commercialization efforts); Nelson, supra note 79, at 104 (discussing the difficulties 
associated with turning invention into innovation); id. at 107–10 (explaining that companies 
often acquire inventions after they have been proven commercially viable). 
 249. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 366 (“[B]ecause the reward theory counsels in favor of 
early patenting and a limited patent term, a patent may expire well before an invention is 
commercially viable.”). 
 250. Abramowicz, supra note 79, at 1081 n.63 (“[I]t might not make sense to 
commercialize a particular invention until another, complementary invention is developed.”); 
Sichelman, supra note 2, at 366 (explaining that early patenting may lead to later 
commercialization). 
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technical and market research. Higher profits would, in turn, provide 
an incentive to invest in commercialization efforts.251  
Second, commercialization efforts would be distinct from 
technical achievement associated with non-obviousness, such that 
both technical and commercial efforts must be made to earn a 
patent.252 If the invention is technically non-obvious but otherwise 
commercially useless, it would not be entitled to a patent. 
Third, the requirement would limit patentability to those 
inventions more likely to increase consumer welfare by satisfying a 
public demand.253 The practical utility requirement of providing a 
public benefit (discussed in Part IV) would be extended to require 
not just the possibility of benefit, but also of one that is likely to 
occur.254  
Fourth, patent disclosure would be improved, because patentees 
would know more about the invention and would face more 
difficulty withholding valuable information from patent applications. 
Inventors are required to disclose the best mode of practicing the 
invention.255 With a commercial utility requirement, the best mode 
would now include commercial practice of the invention. This is 
information that many inventors now know, but need not disclose 
because only operability is required. An improved disclosure would 
potentially allow those learning from the patent to learn not just how 
to make an invention, but also ways to manufacture in quantity, 
market, and distribute the invention, all of which would be necessary 
to show commercial usefulness. 
Fifth, patent claims would be more concrete, because only 
commercially useful claims would be patentable. It will be more 
difficult to show manufacturability and consumer demand for 
abstract claims; markets do not demand amorphous descriptions—
 
 251. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 165, at 403. But see Sichelman, supra note 2, 
at 354 (“[L]ike invention itself, the risks of commercializing inventions regularly demand 
supernormal returns to justify taking them.”). 
 252. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 165, at 405 (discussing 
“commercialization patents” that reward commercially non-obvious advances without respect 
to technical novelty or obviousness). 
 253. Cotropia, supra note 73, at 76 (“If patent law required a use of a certain commercial 
or social worth, an inventor would need to take time to establish that her invention provides 
this level of benefit before filing.”). 
 254. Koneru, supra note 5, at 648 (“In a competition-oriented society, a product’s value 
and best use is reflected ultimately in the product’s commercial success.”). 
 255. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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they demand products. This might spur future innovation 
developing commercializable embodiments of the abstract concepts 
taught by the patent and minimize the first inventor’s ability to block 
future products that were not within its initial development.256  
A related result is that commercial utility should lessen concerns 
about patentees claiming a broader claim scope than they invented. 
To be sure, claim scope will always be an important concern and the 
type of utility required will affect claim scope. But claim scope would 
be more directly affected by usefulness, making it easier to invalidate 
broad claims than might be possible with enablement or written 
description doctrine alone.257 Those desiring broad, generalized 
claims would have a more difficult time showing commercial utility 
of all the potential products that might fall under a broad scope. 
Future products that might technically fall within the claim may be 
well beyond what can be manufactured at the time of patent filing. 
Thus, the emphasis would be on the commercial usefulness of the 
claim rather than the inventor’s attempt to claim more than has been 
invented. Further, to show commercial usefulness, the inventor 
would have to expend more effort actually inventing the broader 
claim scope.258 
2. Potential costs of commercial utility 
The commercial utility standard would also create several 
offsetting costs. For one, commercial utility is difficult to observe, 
which increases administrative costs.259 However, such costs should 
be offset to some extent by a reduction in the number of patent 
 
 256. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 909 (pioneering patents are costly, especially 
when overbroad). But see Oddi, supra note 90, at 1117 (revolutionary inventions are the 
“most important class of patent-induced inventions.”). 
 257. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 356 (“[D]espite the black-letter rule that an inventor 
‘can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described,’ courts and the Patent Office 
typically allow patent claims that are of much broader scope than what is actually disclosed in a 
patent application.” (citation omitted)). 
 258. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 909 (discussing the problems associated 
with patent applications that have an overly-broad scope). 
 259. Koneru, supra note 5, at 648 (“In a competition-oriented society, a product’s value 
and best use is reflected ultimately in the product’s commercial success. That the patent office 
is not in the best position to predict the practical utility of every invention is evident from the 
fact that of the thousands of patents issued each year, only a fraction of them are commercially 
successful.”). 
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applications, presumably because fewer people would seek protection 
for commercially useless inventions.260  
Then again, fewer applications are not necessarily a good thing; 
because most patent applications are published, more filings expand 
knowledge in the public domain even if no patent results.261 These 
patents might increase public knowledge even if they do not promise 
commercial benefits. 
More important, the standard would thwart the filing of patents 
that are not yet commercially valuable, but might be in the future.262 
Of course, this delay is the purpose of the commercial utility 
requirement, but delay may be costly nonetheless. 
The magnitude of the cost of delaying (and potentially 
eliminating) future-commercializable patent filings depends on a 
variety of factors. One factor is the extent to which delay increases 
the cost of inventing and patenting, which reduces the ex ante 
incentive to invent.263 Determining whether this results in a net 
social cost is a difficult question, because the reduced incentive may 
primarily eliminate worthless inventions.264 Additionally, it may be 
optimal to reduce investment in particular types of inventive activity. 
Another factor is the extent of independent inventor patenting. 
Independent inventors often lack commercialization capacity or the 
resources to find and test the data necessary to show commercial 
utility. If independent inventors contribute important knowledge 
through patents,265 then making such patents unattainable may 
 
 260. Cf. Cotropia, supra note 73, at 124 (“More invention information and greater 
resource investment prior to examination reduces the number of conceived ideas that turn into 
examined patent applications.”). 
 261. Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 179, 217 n.218 (2007) (explaining that published applications of rejected patents adds 
to the searchable prior art). 
 262. Eggert, supra note 70, at 781 (arguing that inventors often file before they know 
what the commercial utility of the product will be); Koneru, supra note 5, at 648–50 
(explaining that patent examiners cannot know what future value inventions will have). 
 263. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 374–75 (delayed patenting reduces ex ante incentive to 
invent). 
 264. See, e.g., id. at 371 (“Although waiting to commercialize a patented invention will 
reduce the amount of potential supernormal profits redounding to the patentee’s benefit, it 
will also reduce the supernormal risk that a patentee will make the wrong choice—namely, 
commercializing a valueless invention.”). 
 265. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent 
Troll, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 58 (2009) (“[I]nvocations of the individual inventor motif in 
patent discourse are the product of the collective belief in the narrative itself: that small 
inventors are crucial to technological innovation . . . .”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 
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decrease the benefit of that knowledge. This cost is exacerbated to 
the extent that small companies must have patent filings to obtain 
capital investments;266 without such funding the number of 
innovating firms will decrease. If, however, small and independent 
inventors provide little additional inventive benefits and instead large 
companies simultaneously develop most inventions,267 then 
discouraging independent invention may be an acceptable cost. 
The fact that many inventions may hit the market without 
independent inventors answers concerns that a commercial utility 
standard might unfairly favor larger companies that can afford to 
spend money marketing an invention. While it may be true that 
companies with deep pockets will have an advantage in obtaining 
patents, if the goal of the system is bringing new inventions to the 
market then social welfare may be best served by putting patents into 
the hands of companies most likely to commercialize them.268 In any 
event, evidence shows that most inventions today are developed by 
larger companies.269 
The independent inventor factor extends to a more general 
factor—the value of disclosure of non-commercial inventions 
generally. A commercial utility requirement leads to later patenting, 
which leads to later disclosure.270 Patents—especially revolutionary 
ones—include many important technical contributions that cannot 
be commercialized for reasons unrelated to the inventor, such as 
expensive or unavailable companion technology.271 As discussed 
above, delaying patenting until such companion technology is 
available can spur commercialization. However, to the extent one 
believes that early disclosures add to public knowledge, then delaying 
 
873; Nelson, supra note 79, at 108–09 (discussing research and development by small 
companies). 
 266. Perryman & Setty, supra note 113, at 512. 
 267. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 168 (2008) (explaining that benefits 
of small inventors depends on the type of inventor, but in general small inventors are not 
inventing highest value inventions). 
 268. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 397 (proposing commercialization patents that allow 
protection for parties that commercialize inventions). 
 269. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 267, at 168. 
 270. Kitch, supra note 123, at 270 (explaining that a commercial utility requirement 
would delay patent applications). 
 271. Regulatory approval, such as FDA approval, should not affect the commercial utility; 
the question of whether a drug could be manufactured at a price people are willing to pay is 
unrelated to whether the government will allow the drug to be sold. 
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patenting would deprive others of the ability to learn from the 
disclosure and develop related technology.272 
Even if disclosure value is disregarded, delaying the patenting of 
commercially non-viable inventions will lead to later expiration dates 
of such technology. This is problematic under the premise that many 
basic inventions would not be fully exploited for many years;273 a 
longer patent term may delay commercialization even longer because 
only the owner could exploit the patent. Then again, those 
inventions might be fully exploited earlier if they were covered by 
patents at a more commercially relevant (though later) time. 
A final factor in the cost of delayed patents is the effect on 
concurrent races to invent. Delayed patent filings may extend 
duplicative patent races. If simultaneous research is considered 
inefficient,274 then delaying the patent even further will extend the 
inefficiency.275 Thus, under rent dissipation theory, one wants to end 
the patent race as soon as possible, because delaying patenting will 
cause waste by allowing inventors to seek solutions simultaneously.276 
Further, a commercial utility requirement would exacerbate 
duplicative costs because the commercialization adds more 
uncertainty and cost to the process,277 and only one person reaps 
benefits from expending such costs. 
On the other hand, patent race concerns are overrated for three 
reasons. First, many races would occur in secret anyway, and to the 
extent the races are simultaneous, at least eighteen months of time 
will pass before one inventor learns of a patent filing by another,278 if 
they ever do.279 Second, in many cases the inventor is the only person 
 
 272. Oddi, supra note 90, at 1129–30 (explaining that expanded utility requirements 
decrease incentives to create revolutionary inventions). 
 273. Kitch, supra note 123, at 272 (providing a list of patented technology and 
describing the lengthy time to commercialization). 
 274. Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 870–71. 
 275. Kitch, supra note 123, at 271 (explaining delay limits prospect features of the patent 
system); Cotropia, supra note 73, at 125 (arguing that delay reduces prospect benefits of 
patents). 
 276. Grady & Alexander, supra note 121, at 320–21. 
 277. Cotropia, supra note 73, at 125–26 (“[Delay] increases the cost of patenting, 
forcing an inventor to both expend resources and engage in uncertain research without the 
security of patent protection”); Grady & Alexander, supra note 121, at 339. 
 278. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006). 
 279. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia and Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 
87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009) (explaining that most infringers are unaware of patents covering 
their products). 
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working on the invention and there really is no race (though the 
inventor might not know he or she is the only one looking for a 
solution). If there is no race, benefits are maximized if the law 
provides an incentive to commercialize. Third, the race may lead to 
different beneficial solutions, which is good for competition and 
innovation.280 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article is a new look at an old and neglected doctrine. This 
Article has attempted to reinvigorate the usefulness doctrine by 
clarifying what utility means, how and when it should be measured, 
and showing how it might be used to achieve maximum 
commercialization of inventive activity. Understanding the three 
categories of utility—operability, practicality, and commerciality—as 
well as understanding the importance of how usefulness affects the 
timing of patents sheds light on how usefulness can be used to 
channel inventive activities. 
Some may find it surprising that a seemingly new doctrine—
practical utility—is actually quite old. Its importance is clear: to drive 
inventive activity away from basic science and toward commercialized 
applications. By denying patents on discoveries that have no practical 
benefit to society, researchers may be more likely to focus on applied 
inventions that can be commercialized. 
Some practical application is not enough, however. The newly 
proposed commercial utility standard attempts to weed out patents 
that will never have commercial value, and to incentivize investments 
in other inventions that require more development to be 
commercialized. The standard—like practical utility—is also older 
than one might think, and neglect may be a primary reason such a 
standard has not been effectively utilized. 
The net social benefit of the proposed commercial utility 
standard is unanswered here and may be unanswerable without much 
more data—likely unobtainable data. The result also likely varies by 
industry. Depending on one’s outlook on what factors drive 
 
 280. Koneru, supra note 5, at 645; Merges & Nelson, supra note 140, at 873 
(“Consequently, one might expect that many independent inventors will generate a much 
wider and diverse set of explorations than when the development is under the control of one 
mind or organization.”); Cotropia, supra note 73, at 86 (“Two companies may be attempting 
to solve a given problem and, at the end of the race, produce two viable solutions.”). 
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innovation, commercial utility should provide a social benefit. Thus, 
areas of future research and debate might focus on the timing of 
commercialization in different industries, which types of inventions 
are sought by parallel efforts, and the effect of commercialization 
rules on pioneering inventions. 
Even without a firm answer, this Article points to the questions 
that should be asked and the policy that should be considered. It 
also demonstrates that adjusting usefulness can help maximize the 
commercialization of patents while minimizing the costs of valueless 
patents. 
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